Friday, March 23, 2012
Mystery of the Day: Who Wrote This Email to the Fed Just Before Lehman's Collapse?
Thursday, March 22, 2012
MF Global Roundup: Louis Freeh Feeling the Heat; Bill Black Talks Fraud on Capital Account
We do not want to diminish the hard work of the Commission and the staff, to meet or exceed the Commission’s goals in many other areas. However, the Commission cannot afford to ignore mission-critical responsibilities either. The Commission originally voted to establish these goals and to make every effort to achieve them. Therefore, the Commission must use this report to review its shortcomings and make adjustments to both its budget and surveillance priorities to ensure that critical futures market oversight is not neglected. Failure to make these adjustments expose futures markets to both systemic and operational risk and could cost customers hundreds of millions of dollars. MF Global provides a startling wake up call for the Commission to review its existing rules and regulations for flaws and to ensure that the Commission’s current obsession with the Dodd-Frank rules do not compromise its existing mission.
We are deeply troubled by media reports that you are considering seeking permission of the court to pay enormous bonuses to top executives of the now-bankrupt MF Global Holdings. It is difficult to understand why you would even consider paying anyone a bonus while nearly $1.6 billion in customer money is still missing. And it is absolutely outrageous to propose paying bonuses to the very people who were responsible for the firm’s operational, legal, and financial management at the time customer money disappeared.
3. MFGI’s commodities customers seek in other courts to recover the full balance of the damages to which the law entitles them (i.e., out-of-pocket loss plus other tort damages) from non-debtor persons whose acts and omissions caused MFGI’s breach of its duty to maintain fund segregation. The non-debtors whom the MFGI commodities customers sued consist of former directors and officers and others (Jon Corzine, et al.). If the Chapter 11 Trustee and MFGA were to have their way, these liability policies’ proceeds would not be used to pay down a portion of MFGI’s existing liability to its commodities customers for their out-of-pocket loss. Instead, the policies’ proceeds would be diverted from the injured persons whose claims the policies cover and who have vested rights to the proceeds protected by N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(a)(1), and instead used by Corzine, et al. to defend against actions by MFGI’s commodities customers. Because defense costs erode the policies’ limits, this would also waste MFGI’s estate property and would unlawfully subordinate the rights of MFGI’s commodities customers in order to favor Corzine, et al. The Chapter 11 Trustee’s and MFGA’s positions are outrageous, unjust, inequitable, legally untenable and absurd.
The Trustee is a fiduciary and has the duty to do this as promptly as possible. For unfathomable reasons, the Trustee has not collected the policy proceeds. Instead, the Trustee is passively acquiescing in efforts being made to devest MFGI’s commodities customers of the policies’ proceeds and to divert them to pay Corzine, et al.’s defense costs in actions brought against them in other courts by MFGI’s commodities customers trying to recover the entire loss to which tort law entitles them.
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Tough Questions for CFTC's Gary Gensler as He Heads to Congress to Beg for Money
It's been just over a year since we noted that CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton was taking a page from the Hank "Terminator" Paulson script, when he said he might have to "pull the trigger" if the CFTC's operating budget were not increased (in light of its responsibility to implement rulemaking for the fifteen digit notionally valued OTC swaps market).
Well, fourteen months, one MF Global carcass and $1.6 billion in "vaporized" funds later, CFTC Chairman (ex-Goldmanite) Gary Gensler will again go hat in hand to the House Appropriations Committee, Agricultural Subcommittee, this Thursday, March 22, 2012. We wonder, after the $25 million budget increase he scored last year, does the CFTC still regulate the trillion dollar futures markets by fax? According to Reuters, Commissioner O'Malia said in January, 2011 that the CFTC "may run out of room to store data by October because of cutbacks to its technology budget". Hmm, one wonders if the CFTC bothered to purchase those few extra hard drives before it was lights out for MF Global on Halloween day.
Or, perhaps the CFTC has decided to proactively defund its FOIA office, which cannot seem to muster so much as a denial letter to several pending FOIA requests, not the least of which is a request for details of two private meetings on July 20, 2011, one of which was with Chairman Gensler and MFG President Jon Corzine regarding investment of customer funds (the very same day, by the way, that the CFTC announced in the Federal Register that it would delay rulemaking on this very topic).
EPJ's Robert Wenzel wasn't kidding when he wrote in November, 2008 that "Gensler will have the power to make and break firms", and we have to wonder if he's still "tickled pink" about his vast power grab.
Though our personal preference would be for Mr. Gensler to permanently recuse himself, not only from all things MF Global, but from any and all public positions, we do hope the Ag Subcommittee will not spare itself the chance to grill Gensler on a few pertinent items.
Below is Stanley Haar's letter with several excellent suggestsions. Unfortunately, the hearing will not be televised, so we will not get to see "the Gense" squirm as he did when grilled by Representative Huelskamp.
Now, without futher ado...
-EB
# # #
March 16, 2012
Agriculture Subcommittee
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
Dear Congressman,
It has come to my attention that Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, will be appearing before your subcommittee on March 22 to request a substantial increase in the CFTC budget for the coming year. As a MF Global customer and a CTA whose business was adversely affected by the illegal transfer of funds from my segregated account at MF, I would like to express my extreme displeasure with the performance of the CFTC under Mr. Gensler’s leadership. I was also very disappointed to learn that the hearing will not be webcast, and request that arrangements be made for the public to view Mr. Gensler’s testimony.
The demise of MF Global and the looting of $1.6 billion from customer segregated accounts represents the biggest regulatory failure in the history of organized commodity trading, and threatens the integrity and viability of U.S. futures markets. I urge you to examine the following questions with Mr. Gensler during the upcoming hearing:
1. MF was clearly under increasing financial pressure for several weeks prior to filing for bankruptcy, as evidenced by ratings downgrades, loss of primary dealer status with the NY Fed and a plunging share price. Why didn’t the CFTC enhance its monitoring of segregated accounts in the days and weeks prior to bankruptcy, either on its own or via the DSRO (the CME)?
2. When MF filed for bankruptcy on October 31, over 99% of its accounts were commodity accounts. Why did the CFTC allow SIPA to take over the bankruptcy? More importantly, why was MFGH (the holding company) allowed to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, enabling the continued transfer and scattering of assets to other MF subsidiaries and MF creditors around the world? The bizarre structuring of these two bankruptcies only favored the interests of MF’s general creditors such as JP Morgan, at the expense of customers. Shouldn’t the CFTC be actively protecting farmers, ranchers and the general commodity trading public, not big banks and general creditors?
3. Why didn’t the CFTC immediately move to freeze all MF Global assets, along with the assets of its senior executives, to facilitate the recovery of funds illegally removed from customer segregated accounts? Who at the CFTC handled the decisions related to the bankruptcy, and what communications/contact did they have with the SEC, SIPC, MF management and MF creditors?
4. You are on record stating that CFTC rules require the segregation of customer funds at all times (“every nanosecond”). The amount missing from customer funds ($1.6 billion) represents over ¼ of the entire balance of customer funds at MF and exceeds the total net worth of MF prior to bankruptcy…..clearly not a simple clerical error. Isn’t this prima facie evidence of a criminal violation of CFTC rules? As such, why hasn’t the CFTC already initiated enforcement actions against MF’s executives and directors?
5. The MF Global affair is arguably the biggest crisis for the CFTC since the agency was created. Since you are unable to participate in the investigation due to your long-standing professional relationship and friendship with Mr. Corzine, wouldn’t it be more prudent (and honorable) for you to tender your resignation from the CFTC?
The CFTC clearly failed in its mission to protect the public interest and ensure the proper functioning of commodity markets. They may even have been complicit in allowing the MF bankruptcy to be structured so as to favor big bank creditors at the expense of customers. At the very least, they were "missing-in-action" at critical steps in this process. If the CFTC is unable or unwilling to carry out its mission, why do we even need a CFTC? Perhaps the money needed to fund this agency would be better spent reimbursing defrauded commodity customers, and/or used to reduce the Federal budget deficit.
Regards,
Stanley P. Haar
Haar Capital Management LLC
7280 W. Palmetto Park Road
Suite 102
Boca Raton, Florida 33433
Tel: 561-750-3131
Fax: 561-750-3171
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Agriculture Subcommittee Members
Republicans
• Jack Kingston, Georgia, Chairman Fax: (202) 226-2269
• Tom Latham, Iowa Fax: (202) 225-3301
• Jo Ann Emerson, Missouri Fax: (202) 226-0326
• Robert B. Aderholt, Alabama Fax: (202) 225-5587
• Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming Fax: (202) 225-3057
• Alan Nunnelee, Mississippi Fax: (202) 225-3549
• Tom Graves, Georgia Fax: (202) 225-8272
Democrats
• Sam Farr, California Fax: (202) 225-6791
• Rosa L. DeLauro, Connecticut Fax: (202) 225-4890
• Sanford D. Bishop, Jr., Georgia Fax: (202) 225-2203
• Marcy Kaptur, Ohio Fax: (202) 225-7711
Friday, February 24, 2012
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
You know things are good for the banksters when...
PRESS RELEASE New York Fed Sells $6.2 Billion in Face Amount of
Maiden Lane II LLC Assets; New York Fed Loan to be
repaid in full
February 8, 2012
Printer version
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("New York Fed") today announced that it has sold assets with a current face value of $6.2 billion from its Maiden Lane II LLC ("ML II") portfolio through a competitive process to Goldman Sachs & Co. Proceeds from this sale and the January 19, 2012 transaction, will enable the repayment of the entire remaining outstanding balance of the senior loan from the New York Fed to ML II on the next payment date in early March. The original amount of the senior loan was
$19.5 billion.The transaction was prompted by an unsolicited offer from Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC to BlackRock Solutions, the investment manager for ML II, to buy ML II assets. Consistent with its March 2011 announcement regarding the disposition procedures for ML II, which allowed for these types of reverse inquiries, the New York Fed directed BlackRock Solutions to conduct a sale via a competitive process. The five broker-dealers included in the competitive process were Barclays Capital Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Goldman Sachs & Co., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, and RBS Securities Inc. The broker-dealers were selected based on the strength of each of their recently submitted reverse inquiries for large parcels of the portfolio.
The New York Fed decided to move forward with the transaction only after determining that the winning bid represented good value for the public. Net proceeds from the sale will be reported as part of the portfolio’s normal reporting schedule on April 16, 2012.
William C. Dudley, President of the New York Fed, said, "I am pleased with the continued interest in these assets and am especially gratified that the New York Fed's loan to ML II will be repaid as a result of the sale announced today."
As stated previously, the New York Fed, through BlackRock Solutions, will dispose of the remaining securities in the ML II portfolio individually and in segments over time as market conditions warrant through a competitive sales process, while taking appropriate care to avoid market disruption. There will be no fixed timeframe for the sales; at each stage, the Federal Reserve will only transact if the best available bid represents good value for the public.
Following repayment of the New York Fed’s senior loan, additional proceeds will be allocated as per the ML II agreement. Proceeds from additional asset sales that are allocated to the New York Fed will be included in the Federal Reserve’s remittances of income to the U.S. Treasury.
The New York Fed publishes on its website a list of all the securities in the ML II portfolio. In order to allow the public to track progress on asset dispositions, the New York Fed provides monthly updates on portfolio holdings and a list of the securities sold within the prior month. In addition, it provides quarterly updates on total proceeds from sales, including a breakdown by counterparty. The New York Fed will also provide further details regarding all ML II transactions, including an account showing the acquirer and the price paid for each individual security three months after the last asset is sold, ensuring timely accountability without jeopardizing the ability to generate maximum sale proceeds for the public.
For more information, including the most recent holdings report as of December 31, 2011,
visit Maiden Lane II LLC.Contact:
Andrea Priest
(212) 720-6139
(646) 720-6139
Andrea.priest@ny.frb.org
Monday, January 9, 2012
Did the New York Fed Lie to the GAO During the Mini-Fed Audit?
Thursday, January 5, 2012
Scrubbed MF Global Filing Resurfaces at the SEC, But More Questions About Suspicious Filing Practices Surface
Confidentiality
Rule 17a-5(e)(3) provides that the audited financial statements “shall be public, except that, if the Statement of Financial Condition . . . is bound separately from the balance of the annual audited financial statements . . . the balance of the annual audited financial statements shall be deemed confidential, except that they shall be available for official use . . .”In order to receive confidential treatment for the financial statements other than the Statement of Financial Condition in accordance with Rule 17a-5(e)(3), the broker-dealer should do the following:Bind the Statement of Financial Condition separately from the balance of the annual audited financial statements or place it in a separate package. Complete and attach an “Annual Audited Report, Form X-17A-5, Part III, Facing Page” to the Statement of Financial Condition. Mark the Facing Page “Public.”Bind the balance of the annual audited financial statements separately or place them in a separate package. Complete and attach an “Annual Audited Report, Form X-17A-5, Part III, Facing Page” to these statements. Mark the Facing Page “Confidential Treatment Requested.”The public and non-public portions of the financial statements must be clearly segregated and the Facing Page must be appropriately marked. For example, the Facing Page attached to the Statement of Financial Condition should not be marked “Confidential.” Further, if the Statement of Financial Condition is not bound separately or placed in a separate package, then, in accordance with Rule 17a-5(e)(3), none of the statements will be accorded confidential treatment.Rule 17a-5(e)(3) does not require the submission of a letter requesting confidential treatment. It is not necessary to mark the mailing envelope “Confidential.”
Friday, December 23, 2011
On the First Day of Christmas, MF Global Documents Disappeared from the SEC's Public EDGAR Database

Yes, the "scanned.pdf" link is there, but if one examines the PDF, all that is present is the cover section--absolutely no financial data. Inasmuch as the "Filing Date Changed" is over six months from the "Filing Date", we are left to wonder if a redacted version was simply slipped in toward the end of 2004 (which, incidentally, is when the company was preparing for its fraud-laced IPO).
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Why was MF Global put through a SIPA liquidation designed for securities brokers?
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989[Section 765] Subsection (a) of this section [enacted as section 766(h)] provides that with respect to liquidation of commodity brokers which are not clearing organizations, the trustee shall distribute [commodity] customer property to customers on the basis and to the extent of such customers' allowed net equity claims, and in priority to all other claims. This section grants customers' claims first priority in the distribution of the estate. Subsection (b) [enacted as section 766(i)] grants the same priority to member property and other customer property in the liquidation of a clearing organization. A fundamental purpose of these provisions is to ensure that the property entrusted by customers to their brokers will not be subject to the risks of the broker's business and will be available for disbursement to customers if the broker becomes bankrupt.
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Dear Congress: Bernanke Just Lied to You
Correction of Recent Press Reports RegardingFederal Reserve Emergency Lending During the Financial CrisisRecent press reports contain numerous errors and misrepresentations about Federal Reserve emergency lending during the financial crisis.First, these articles have made repeated claims that the Federal Reserve conducted "secret" lending that was not disclosed either to the public or the Congress. No lending program was ever kept secret from the Congress or the public. All of the programs were publicly announced when they were initiated, and information about all lending under the programs was publicly released--both on a weekly basis through the Federal Reserve's public balance sheet release and through detailed monthly reports to the Congress, both of which were also posted on the Federal Reserve's website.
It is true that, generally, the names of the counterparties and borrowers from the emergency facilities were not immediately disclosed, consistent with general central banking practice. Releasing the names of these institutions in real-time, in the midst of the financial crisis, would have seriously undermined the effectiveness of the emergency lending and the confidence of investors and borrowers. These matters were discussed extensively at the time in the press, and the Chairman and other members of the Board discussed them numerous times in hearings before the Congress.In point of fact, the Federal Reserve took great care to ensure that Congress was well-informed of the magnitude and manner of its lending. As required by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, passed in late 2008, the Federal Reserve reported regularly on the outstanding balances in its Sec. 13(3) lending facilities as well as on collateral (by type and quality) for the loans. Beginning in June 2009, the Federal Reserve went well beyond these legal requirements in the information it made available in its monthly public reports to the Congress, which were also posted on the Federal Reserve's website.
Moreover, Congress was well informed of the volume of borrowing by large banks. For instance, the monthly reports showed the daily average borrowing during the month in the aggregate for the five largest discount window borrowers, the next five, and the rest. Similar information was also provided for lending at the emergency facilities.In addition, the issue of counterparty disclosure was well-known to the Congress and was addressed as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. Under provisions of the Sanders Amendment, the names of all counterparties and borrowers from the emergency lending facilities and the Term Auction Facility (TAF) were disclosed on December 1, 2010. Data provided included the names of the borrowers, the date that credit was extended, the interest rate, information about the collateral, and other relevant terms. Similar information is supplied for swap line draws and repayments. Details for each agency MBS purchase included the counterparty to the transaction, the date of the transaction, the amount of the transaction, and the price at which each transaction was conducted. Additional disclosures of discount window borrowers and transactions information were made on March 31, 2011.
Although the articles do not stress this point, it is important to note that nearly all of the emergency assistance has, in fact, been fully repaid or is on track to be fully repaid. This fact has been verified both by the Board's independent auditors and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).Importantly, Federal Reserve lending should in no way be compared with government spending. Federal Reserve lending is repaid, with interest, and the Federal Reserve has never suffered a credit loss. As provided in the Dodd-Frank Act, the GAO conducted a review of all of the emergency lending facilities and confirmed in its report on July 21, 2011, that not only were there no material issues with respect to the design, implementation and operation of the facilities, but that all loans to the facilities were fully repaid or expected to be fully repaid.
Third, the articles make no mention that the emergency loans and other assistance have generated considerable income for the American taxpayers. As reported in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors, alongside the Board's audited financial statements, the emergency lending programs have generated an estimated $20 billion in interest income for the Treasury. Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, the Federal Reserve returned to the taxpayers over $125 billion in excess earnings on its operations, including emergency lending. These amounts have been publicly announced and are reflected in the Office of Management and Budget's financial statements for the government and have been verified by the Federal Reserve's independent outside auditors. The Federal Reserve is on track to return a comparable amount to taxpayers this year as well.
Fourth, the articles discuss the lending made to large banks but never note that Federal Reserve lending programs went far beyond such institutions--all in furtherance of supporting the provision of credit to U.S. households and businesses. Literally hundreds of institutions borrowed from the Federal Reserve--not just large banks. The TAF had some 400 borrowers and the discount window some 2,100 borrowers. The TALF made more than 2,000 loans, while the commercial paper funding facility provided direct assistance to some 120 American businesses.The articles also fail to note that the lending directly helped support American businesses by providing emergency funding so that they could meet weekly payrolls and on-going expenses. The commercial paper funding facility, for example, provided support to businesses as diverse as Harley-Davidson and National Rural Utilities, when the usual market mechanism for their day-to-day funding completely dried up.
Fifth, the articles misleadingly depict financial institutions receiving liquidity assistance as insolvent and in "deep trouble." During a financial panic, otherwise solvent banks and other financial institutions can be forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices in order to meet the demands of depositors and other sources of funding. Central bank liquidity lending is designed to stem the panic by giving financial institutions a source of financing that permits them to refrain from selling assets during the panic. Again, unmentioned in these articles--but a central point--all discount window loans extended during the crisis were fully repaid with interest, indicating that, with rare exceptions, recipients of these loans generally suffered from temporary liquidity problems rather than being fundamentally insolvent. In the handful of instances when discount window loans were extended to troubled institutions, it was in consultation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to facilitate a least-cost resolution; in these instances also, the Federal Reserve was fully repaid.
Finally, one article incorrectly asserted that banks "reaped an estimated $13 billion of income by taking advantage of the Fed's below-market rates." Most of the Federal Reserve's lending facilities were priced at a penalty over normal market rates so that borrowers had economic incentives to exit the facilities as market conditions normalized, and the rates that the Federal Reserve charged on its lending programs did not provide a subsidy to borrowers.




