Thursday, July 21, 2011

GAO Audit of Federal Reserve No Bid Contracts Fails to Finger Geithner, Baxter, Dimon, Immelt and Friedman in Suspicious BlackRock Contract

Remember the Audit the Fed bill that was supposed to bring the financial system to its knees if Congress dared pass it? Remember the toothless, watered down version that finally made it into Dodd-Frank and at the time was itself controversial?

Pursuant to direction under Dodd-Frank, the Government Accountability Office today released a 266 page report detailing its findings after a review of the numerous emergency programs instituted by the Federal Reserve from 2008 to 2010. Among the many findings was that the bulk of over half billion dollars in service contracts were awarded without bid. While the report is a step in the right direction, its failure to mention the most suspicious contract (about which we know only because of Congressionally subpoenaed email records of the New York Fed), suggests the review was either facile or compromised. In other words, we cannot rely on even the simplest of half measures when it comes to providing Fed accountability.

Here is what the GAO wrote (all bolding and brackets are ours, throughout this post):
Reserve Banks Awarded Largest Contracts Noncompetitvely and Would Benefit From Additional Guidance on Seeking Competition

Although FRBNY awarded contracts both competitively and
noncompetitively for the emergency programs, the highest-value
contracts were awarded noncompetitively due to exigent circumstances.
FRBNY awarded almost two-thirds of its contracts noncompetitively,
which accounted for 79 percent of all vendor compensation (see fig. 4).
Eight of the 10 largest contracts were awarded noncompetitively. The
largest noncompetitive contract was valued at more than $108.4 million,
while the largest competitive contract was valued at $26.6 million.

Click image to enlarge.
Explaining the process by which FRBNY awarded contracts:
FRBNY awarded contracts in accordance with its acquisition policy, which
applied to all services associated with the emergency programs and
single-institution assistance. FRBNY is a private corporation created by
statute and is not subject to the FAR. Instead, FRBNY developed its own
acquisition policy, called Operating Bulletin 10.

Operating Bulletin 10 states that business areas may use noncompetitive
processes in special circumstances, such as when a service is available
from only one vendor or in exigent circumstances. FRBNY cited exigent
circumstances for the majority of the noncompetitive contract awards.78
Footnote 78 reads:
78 Of the noncompetitive contracts we reviewed, FRBNY awarded only three under the sole-source exception, when a service was available from only one vendor.
This fact will be key later on. Delving into the GAO's findings:
A guiding principle of the FAR, which applies to all executive agencies,
not to the Reserve Banks, is to ensure that agencies are able to deliver
the best value product or service in a timely manner while fulfilling
agencies’ policy objectives. Similarly, Operating Bulletin 10 provides a
framework for acquiring goods and services at the most favorable terms.
However, while the FAR requires certain activities for noncompetitive
awards and identifies specific steps to take, Operating Bulletin 10 does
not. Without similar guidance, FRBNY could be missing opportunities to enhance competition and provide the best value service in
noncompetitive awards. Examples of activities required or restricted by
the FAR include the following:

Soliciting multiple bids. The FAR requires contracting officers to solicit
as many offers as is practicable in the absence of full and open
competition.79 FRBNY officials stated that in noncompetitive
circumstances business areas are encouraged to collect a reasonable
number of competitive quotations and noted that, in at least some
cases, staff members contacted multiple vendors before awarding
contracts noncompetitively. However, FRBNY did not contact multiple
vendors before awarding some of the largest noncompetitive
emergency program and assistance contracts.80

Restrictions on contract duration and scope. Operating Bulletin 10
does not place any limits or restrictions on the duration of a
noncompetitive contract, nor does it require subsequent competition.
In contrast, the FAR generally limits the duration of contracts awarded
under “exigent circumstances” to the time necessary to meet the
unusual and compelling requirements and award a new contract using
competitive procedures, and such contracts may generally not exceed
1 year.81 FRBNY’s longest and most expensive contracts were
awarded noncompetitively and lasted more than 2 years and, in some
cases, could potentially last as long as 10 years.82 Some of these
contracts included distinct services that, while related, were needed at
different times and with different degrees of urgency. FRBNY officials
said that in some cases they think there would be limited benefits to
opening noncompetitive contracts to competition. FRBNY held
subsequent competitions for competitively awarded Agency MBS
program and TALF contracts when the terms of the programs
changed.

Justifying noncompetitive procedures. Operating Bulletin 10 requires
business areas to draft a memorandum that includes sufficient
documentation to justify the noncompetitive acquisition. However,
Operating Bulletin 10 does not provide guidance on what information
should be included in the memorandum. FRBNY justification
memoranda typically included background information on the
emergency program, vendor scope of work, vendor selection factors,
and an explanation of the special circumstances necessitating
noncompetitive awards. The memoranda did not typically identify
efforts made to promote competition, which the FAR requires.
Regarding Vendor Selection Criteria, the GAO makes a curious statement in the next paragraph:
FRBNY considered a number of factors when selecting vendors for both
competitive and noncompetitive contract awards, including a vendor’s
knowledge and expertise and ability to meet program requirements.
FRBNY also considered a vendor’s previous working relationship with
FRBNY or program participants as part of the selection criteria for
competitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts. FRBNY selected
vendors that had previous working relationships with FRBNY and the
program recipients so that it could leverage that familiarity to shorten the
vendor’s learning curve or ramp-up time. For example, FRBNY
noncompetitively selected BlackRock as the investment manager for
Maiden Lanes II and III because BlackRock had already evaluated the
underlying assets pursuant to an engagement with AIG prior to the
extension of credit by FRBNY.
These would constitute two of the three sole-source contracts mentioned in footnote 78, above. The appendixes disclose that BlackRock earned $24.1 million and $50.0 million for serving as the investment manager of Maiden Lane II and III, respectively.




BlackRock was also the investment manager for the original Maiden Lane portfolio that took on the toxic Bear Stearns assets. For serving as investment manager, it was paid $107.6 million in fees.


Recall that there are two bases upon which a no-bid contracts would be awarded: exigency or sole source, whereby there are no practical alternatives to a single service provider. The GAO report does not say on what basis the BlackRock Maiden Lane no-bid contract was awarded, but given the roughly three month window between the mid-March announcement of the new facility and the commencement of management by BlackRock in late June, it would be difficult to claim exigency. Also note the contract was not dated until September 9, 2008, several months later.

Thanks to the aforementioned subpoenaed emails of the NY Fed, we do in fact know that the BlackRock Maiden was sole-sourced. As we wrote in January, 2011:
[W]e'd like to know why BlackRock management of Maiden Lane I was sole sourced without a "clear reason", as is implied by the below email to FRBNY [then] Senior VP, Sarah Dahlgren, which we excerpt from the below document presented to Congress, with emphasis and brackets ours:
To Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS
Re: Sole Source

Spent some time with him [Tom Baxter, Jr., FRBNY GC] tonight. (He doesn't understand ML3, and I can't begin explain it either -- so don't needle him! -- and I am going to have [Paul] Whynott [FRBNY VP] spend some time with him tomorrow, BTW, you might touch base with Joyce [Hansen, FRBNY Deputy GC] about her reaction to Sunday's briefing; I think she had some concerns about how ML3 was presented to Geithner, which she expressed to Paul.) [Geithner] knew that Stephanie [Heller?, FRBNY Asst. GC] was handling the Blackrock contract -- he didn't express any concerns -- and I explained that, in contrast to MLI, we had a clear reason to sole source it this time (that they had already modeled, etc.). So, although I have no worries, yes, probably worth reviewing it with him [Geithner] before taking it to Tom."
It appears there was quite some consternation at the highest levels at the NY Fed about this contract award, yet no mention in the GAO report.

In follow up posts, we will document the full email chain from which the above was excerpted, explore just exactly how the NY Fed's Acquisition Policy (Operating Bulletin Number 10) implicates some of the country's top bankers in this no-bid contract scandal, discuss the GAO's findings of failure in conflicts of interest disclosure, and the GAO's own failure to follow its Congressional mandate under Dodd-Frank.

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Krugman Gets it Right With Gold

Everyone seems to be making fun of Paul Krugman, who's out on the NY Times oped page today, suggesting the run-up in gold might be due to Goldline's advertising on Glenn Beck show. Both Bob Wenzel and Bob Murphy have added their two cents.

Krugman concludes:
Market prices almost always tell you something useful. But sometimes what they tell you is that there’s a marketing scam in progress.
I'm afraid I have to side with Krugman on this one as I think he's on to something. In fact, should demand ever falter for the Treasury's notes and bills, I suggest the Fed simply purchase airtime on its behalf on the Glenn Beck show.

Call it QE Beck, a truly patriotic marketing scam.

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Sorry MMTers, the Economy Doesn't Exist and GDP is Bogus

The other day, a practitioner of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), Robert Koerner, called for a sythesis between MMT and Austrian Economics. Robert Wenzel, at EPJ Central, provided an Austrian rebuttal here, which provoked an interesting discussion in the comments. Unfortunately, this appears to be part of a trend, in which the bogus constructs of MMT are passed off as somehow part of Austrian economics, which they are most definitely not. This post will demonstrate that MMT is simply a justification for the broken and irreparable status quo, but with a novel face.

Friend of EPJ, Robert Murphy, provides some background and criticism of its foundations, here*. To say that so-called MMTers come to some rather unconventional conclusions is understated, and something from which they do not run. For instance, Murphy writes, "if the federal government runs a budget surplus, then by simple accounting the private sector can't save."

However, at its heart, MMT appears to be based on accounting identities derived from national income accounting methods, which are themselves based upon imperfect abstractions. These are the same familiar equations [sadly] taught in nearly every economic intro course:

GDP = C + I + G + (X — M)
and
GDP = C + S + T

Austrian economist, Frank Shostack, tears apart GDP and its foundations here (emphasis mine):
To gain insight into the state of an economy, most people rely on a statistic called Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP framework looks at the value of final goods and services produced during a particular time interval, usually a quarter or a year. This statistic is constructed in accordance with the view that what drives an economy is not the production of wealth but rather its consumption. What matters here is demand for final goods and services. Since consumer outlays are the largest part of overall demand, it is commonly held that consumer demand sets in motion economic growth.

By focusing exclusively on final goods and services, the GDP framework lapses into a world of fantasy wherein goods emerge because of people's desires. This is in total disregard to the facts of reality (that is, the issue of whether such desires can be accommodated). All that matters in this view is the demand for goods, which in turn will give rise almost immediately to their supply. Because the supply of goods is taken for granted, this framework completely ignores the whole issue of the various stages of production that precede the emergence of the final good.

In the real world, it is not enough to have demand for goods: one must have the means to accommodate people's desires. Means—i.e., various intermediate goods that are required in the production of final goods—are not readily available; they have to be produced. Thus, in order to manufacture a car, there is a need for coal that will be employed in the production of steel, which in turn will be employed to manufacture an array of tools. These in turn are used to produce other tools and machinery and so on, until we reach the final stage of the production of a car. The harmonious interaction of the various stages of production results in the final product.

The GDP framework gives the impression that it is not the activities of individuals that produce goods and services, but something else outside these activities called the "economy." However, at no stage does the so-called "economy" have a life of its own independent of individuals. The so-called economy is a metaphor—it doesn't exist.

By lumping the values of final goods and services together, government statisticians concretize the fiction of an economy by means of the GDP statistic. By regarding the economy as something that exists in the real world, mainstream economists reach a bizarre conclusion that what is good for individuals might not be good for the economy, and vice versa. Since the economy cannot have a life of its own without individuals, obviously what is good for individuals cannot be bad for the economy.

The GDP framework cannot tell us whether final goods and services that were produced during a particular period of time are a reflection of real wealth expansion, or a reflection of capital consumption.

For instance, if a government embarks on the building of a pyramid, which adds absolutely nothing to the well-being of individuals, the GDP framework will regard this as economic growth. In reality, however, the building of the pyramid will divert real funding from wealth-generating activities, thereby stifling the production of wealth.

Because the GDP framework completely disregards the intermediate stages of production, it can be of little help in the assessment of boom-bust cycles. It is little wonder then that mainstream economists are forced to conclude that recessions are a response to a sudden fall in consumer spending. Consequently, it is quite logical within the GDP framework to advocate loose monetary policies to revive the "economy."

The whole idea of GDP gives the impression that there is such a thing as the national output. In the real world, however, wealth is produced by someone and belongs to somebody. In other words, goods and services are not produced in totality and supervised by one supreme leader. This in turn means that the entire concept of GDP is devoid of any basis in reality. It is an empty concept.
Quoting the Austrian masters on the fallacy of national accounting:
According to Mises the whole idea that one can establish the value of the national output is somewhat far-fetched:
The attempt to determine in money the wealth of a nation or the whole mankind are as childish as the mystic efforts to solve the riddles of the universe by worrying about the dimension of the pyramid of Cheops.
Furthermore,
If a business calculation values a supply of potatoes at $100, the idea is that it will be possible to sell it or replace it against this sum. If a whole entrepreneurial unit is estimated at $1,000,000 it means that one expects to sell it for this amount the businessman can convert his property into money, but a nation cannot.
In addition to all these issues, there are serious problems regarding the calculation of the GDP statistic. To calculate a total, several things must be added together. To add things together, they must have some unit in common. It is not possible to add refrigerators to cars and shirts to obtain the total of final goods. Since the total real output cannot be meaningfully defined, obviously it cannot be quantified.

To solve this problem, economists employ total monetary expenditure on goods which they divide by an average price of those goods. There is, however, a serious problem with this. What is price? It is the rate of exchange between goods established in a transaction between two individuals at a particular place and a particular point in time. The price, or the rate of exchange of one good in terms of another, is the amount of the other good divided by the amount of the first. In the money economy, price will be the amount of money divided by the amount of the first good.

Suppose two transactions were conducted. In the first transaction, one TV set is exchanged for $1,000. In the second transaction, one shirt is exchanged for $40. The price or the rate of exchange in the first transaction is $1000/1TV set. The price in the second transaction is $40/1shirt. In order to calculate the average price, we must add these two ratios and divide them by 2. However, $1000/1TV set cannot be added to $40/1shirt, implying that it is not possible to establish an average price.

It is interesting to note that in commodity markets, prices are quoted as Dollars/barrel of oil, Dollars/ounce of gold, Dollars/tonne of copper, etc. Obviously, it wouldn't make much sense to establish an average of these prices. On this Rothbard wrote, "Thus, any concept of average price level involves adding or multiplying quantities of completely different units of goods, such as butter, hats, sugar, etc., and is therefore meaningless and illegitimate."
More on the fallacy of average price level, and getting to the heart of the matter (that GDP is simply a tool of coercion for the ruling class):
The employment of various sophisticated methods to calculate the average price level cannot bypass the essential issue that it is not possible to establish an average price of various goods and services. Accordingly, various price indices that government statisticians compute are simply arbitrary numbers. If price deflators are meaningless, however, so is the real GDP statistic.

So what are we to make out of the periodical pronouncements that the economy, as depicted by real GDP, grew by a particular percentage? All we can say is that this percentage has nothing to do with real economic growth and that it most likely mirrors the pace of monetary pumping.

As a rule, the more money created by the central bank and the banking sector, the larger the monetary spending will be. This in turn means that the rate of growth of what is labeled as the real economy will closely mirror rises in money supply.

So it is no wonder that in the GDP framework, the central bank can cause real economic growth, and most economists who slavishly follow this framework believe that this is so. Much so-called economic research produces "scientific support" for popular views that, by means of monetary pumping, the central bank can grow the economy. It is overlooked by all these studies that no other conclusion can be reached once it is realized that GDP is a close relative of the money stock.

One is tempted to ask, why it is necessary to know the growth of the so-called "economy"? What purpose can this type of information serve? In a free unhampered economy, this type of information would be of little use to entrepreneurs. The only indicator that any entrepreneur relies upon is profit and loss. How can the information that the so-called "economy" grew by 4 percent in a particular period help an entrepreneur make profit?

What an entrepreneur requires is not general information but rather specific information regarding the demand for his specific product, or products. The entrepreneur himself has to establish his own network of information concerning a particular venture.

Things are quite different, however, when the government and the central bank tamper with businesses. Under these conditions, no businessman can ignore the GDP statistic since the government and the central bank react to this statistic by means of fiscal and monetary policies. Likewise, participants in financial markets closely follow the GDP statistic in order to assess the likely responses of the central bank.

The entire army of economists is busy guessing whether the central bank will lower, or raise, interest rates. Moreover, to provide a rationale for all this, a new form of economics labeled macroeconomics was invented. Needless to say, this type of economics doesn’t deal with the real world but rather with a nonexistent entity called the economy.

By means of the GDP framework, government and central bank officials generate the impression that they can navigate the economy. According to this myth, the "economy" is expected to follow the growth path outlined by omniscient officials. Thus whenever the rate of growth slips to below the outlined growth path, officials are expected to give the "economy" a suitable push. Conversely, whenever the "economy" is growing too fast, the officials are expected to step in to cool off the "economy's" rate of growth.
The powerful conclusion:
If the effect of these policies were confined only to the GDP statistic then the whole exercise would be harmless. However, these policies tamper with activities of wealth producers and thereby undermine people's well-being. To take a particular instance, by acting to make the nonexistent entity the "economy" more efficient, U.S. government officials are busy destroying a major wealth generator—Microsoft. Likewise, by means of monetary pumping and interest rate manipulations, the Federal Reserve doesn't help generate more prosperity, but rather sets in motion a "stronger GDP" and the consequent menace of the boom-bust cycle—i.e., economic impoverishment.

We can thus conclude that the GDP framework is an empty abstraction devoid of any link to the real world. Notwithstanding this, the GDP framework is in big demand by governments and central bank officials since it provides justification for their interference with businesses. It also provides an illusory frame of reference to assess the performance of government officials.
Bob Roddis writes in the comments in Wenzel's post about MMT's intellectual heritage:
Never forget that MMT godfather Abba Ptachya Lerner’s magnum opus was “The Economics of Control”:

Chapter l. INTRODUCTION. THE CONTROLLED ECONOMY
The fundamental aim of socialism is not the abolition of private property but the extension of democracy. This is obscured by dogmas of the right and of the left. The benefits of both the capitalist economy and the collectivist economy can be reaped in the controlled economy.
And again, in a subsequent comment:
More things I have dug up on MMT…

1. Abba Lerner was a longtime economic Stalinist. He writes in the preface to “The Economics of Control” that he was long resistant to the any “free market” analysis but finally he thanks Joan Robinson for getting him to overcome his prejudices against “Mr. Keynes great advancement in economic understanding”. Great. A Stalinist tempered with some Keynesianism. That’ll work, right? This is their starting point and helps explain how they can be so joyous when they explain “The government is not revenue constrained!!! [how cool is that??]”

2. In 1980, two years before he died, Abba Lerner (1903-1982) was dabbling in the following price control system based upon this article by David Colander, a co-author of a 1980 book with Lerner:
Lerner found the implications of sellers’ inflation so important that, beginning in the 1960s, he changed his research program to center on finding cures for sellers’ inflation. Initially he toyed with various administrative wage and price control policies, but he found those lacking and soon gave them up. He replaced them, first, with a tax based incomes policy and ultimately, a market based[??!!!] incomes policy in which property rights in prices are set and individuals have to buy the right to change prices from others who change their price in the opposite direction. It was this idea that formed the basis of our market [???!!!!] anti inflation (MAP) book. (Lerner and Colander 1980) Under MAP, rights in value added prices would be tradable so that any firm wanting to change its nominal price would have to make a trade with another firm that wanted to change its nominal price in the opposite direction. Thus, by law, the average price level would be constant but relative prices would be free to change [@page 12]

So, we now know enough about MMT to know that Abba Lerner wrote a book in 1980 proposing a ghastly and barbaric Rube Goldberg system where one would be precluded from raising (setting) one’s one prices without trading the right to do so with somebody else under penalty of statist law. But I thought the MMTers could cure inflation just by changing the tax code. Hmmm.
And it was Keynes, himself, in collaboration with a few other economists and statisticians at the beginning of World War II, who invented the national accounting constructs that would give rise to GNP and GDP. All for the purpose of justifying a protracted, expensive war. Writes Judo Cuyvers in the Economic Journal:
The elaboration of national economic accounts and detailed national income estimates is generally considered to be a direct result of Keynes's emphasis on the main macroeconomic determinants of employment and aggregate demand.
Scholars have repeatedly stressed Keynes's impact in the course of the first few years of the Second World War, or have pointed to Colin Clark's pioneering calculations during the 1930s. However, as we shall show in the following pages, it was at the very beginning of the Second World War, not in 1937 nor in 1941, that British national income accounting entered a critical phase. Determined to convince the authorities and public opinion of the necessity of financing the war effort properly, Keynes immediately set himself the task of elaborating a proposal based on statistical evidence. It was during the period between Octboer-November 1939 and February 1940, when Keynes was working on his December 1939 article in this JOURNAL and subsequently on his pamphlet How to Pay for the War, in close statistical collaboration with Erwin Rothbarth, that the first double-entry national accounts were developed and the still very crude accounting and estimation procedures became essential steps in economic policy making.
In true Ministry of Truth fashion, decades of Keynesian and related indoctrination continues to facilitate and propagate the lie that the banking system is somehow not regulated enough--too free market. As Tom Woods recently wrote:
She likewise thinks the banking system is pretty close to a free market – after all, hasn’t she seen news reports about bank "deregulation"? To the contrary, the banking system is perhaps the least free-market sector of the entire economy. The whole system is overseen by the government-created Federal Reserve System, which presides over a system-wide cartel. It involves monopolistic legal tender laws, a monopoly of the note issue, artificial disabilities on other media of exchange apart from the depreciating dollar, and various forms of bailout guarantees. For a sense of what a free market in banking would actually look like, read Murray N. Rothbard’s The Mystery of Banking.
Even if we ignore MMT's dubious historical origins and assume beneficent intent, it's important that Austrian economics not be conflated with MMT and the work of its practitioners, such as Wray, Mosler*, Aureback, Mitchell, Fullwiler. Why make the distinction? As governments and economies fail around the world, there is and will be increasing demand for alternatives. MMT ensures the status quo ante. It's simply another system for central planning and price fixing. And prices matter, as I wrote last November:
Though it's possible we will eventually transition to a new Ponzi (which is in the works), the case for optimism can be made that a better informed public with no prospects for a future bailout will rebuild a system in which prices are given the respect they deserve.

* EPJ Regular, Taylor Conant, produced a series of critiques of Warren Mosler's book called "Seven Deadly Frauds of Economic Policy", which itself is based upon MMT.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Ex-Goldmanite NY Fed President, Bill Dudley, Looks to Join the Council on Foreign Relations

From his daily schedule released by the New York Federal Reserve only an hour ago, we learn that Bill "Let them eat iPads" Dudley conducted a meeting for 30 minutes in his private office at the Fed regarding one "CFR Application" on February 15, 2011.


Click for larger image.

According to the official CFR roster, he's not yet a member:

Though he has spoken before the CFR on a previous occasion, presumably the delay in membership will be rectified now that the final QE2 commissions gift has been doled out to the primary dealers.

Unlike previously released schedules, we find Mr. Dudley refrained from meeting with the top banksters. No breakfast with Jamie Dimon (though there were some meetings with other JPMers) and, curiously, not one meeting with a Goldman Sacks exec. It's increasingly looking like Lloyd should have flown through the fog to that meeting with Obama, after all.

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Just ahead of Ron Paul's latest Fed hearing, a Fed paper questions blanket bailouts

Is the Fed saying goodbye to moral hazard? Likely not. At least, not for the Fab Five (or is it the Turby Twenty), who will get their liquidity fixes until the Fed no longer presides over the POMO opium fields. For everyone else, though, a new NY Fed policy paper seems to float just this idea: that a resolution procedure (read--gasp--breakup) might be preferred to providing blanket liquidity to all takers. That is, Kalamazoo S&L might starve at the discount window (or similar) waiting for Zimbabwe Ben to drop some morsels, while JPM and Goldman dine at the table on lobster and tenderloin.

Though the NY Fed paper has undoubtedly been in the works for months, if not longer, the timing is interesting. Only today, the top lawyers of the NY Fed and the Board of Governors will get grilled in front of Ron Paul's monetary committee in a hearing entitled "Federal Reserve Lending Disclosure: FOIA, Dodd-Frank, and the Data Dump". Of particular interest will be why certain (sometimes unexpected) names pop up so frequently in the thousands of pages of bailout docs released by the Fed.

The research paper is called, "A Model of Liquidity Hoarding and Term Premia in Inter-Bank Markets" and primarily focuses on rollover risk as a determinant of market stress and freezes. (Unfortunately, it is left to the reader to extrapolate to the logical extreme and wonder what happens when rollover risk of the US debt portfolio itself surfaces, concurrent with the last marginal buyer of Treasurys losing all credibility).

The interesting part is the Policy Conjectures on page 22, which we reproduce in full (emphasis and brackets ours):
4.3 Policy conjectures

It is important to consider cases where the lending banks' precautionary demand for liquidity may be excessive relative to its socially efficient level. In turn, this would suggest possible policy interventions to address excessive hoarding of liquidity by highly leveraged banks. Is it desirable to have an unconditional (traditional) lender of last resort (LOLR) in which a central bank provides liquidity to strong as well as weak banks? Or would it be better to have a solvency-contingent LOLR in which the central bank provides liquidity only to sufficiently strong banks? And should there instead (or in addition) be a resolution authority that forces weak banks to reduce their rollover risk? We conjecture that (i) a resolution authority to address weak banks' excess leverage and rollover risk, and (ii) a solvency-contingent LOLR by a central bank (that itself has lower credit and rollover risk than its banks), are likely to be more effective interventions than the traditional, unconditional LOLR.

Such welfare analysis can also help understand the impact of interventions that were put in place during the crisis of 2007-09, such as the Term Auction Facility (TAF) by the Federal Reserve for 28-day and later 84-day loans. We conjecture that through these facilities, the Federal Reserve, acting as a relatively risk-free intermediary, intermediated liquidity hoardings (reserves) of riskier banks to banks that participated in the facilities. This intervention should have increased volumes of lending to the real sector by the participating banks. [Note, lending in the real sector did not pick up, so is this a tacit suggestion that the Fed exacerbated the problem with its bailouts?] Note that under the alternative view, that stress in inter-bank markets is caused purely by borrower credit-risk problems, lending by central bank to banks at lower than market rates would effectively constitute a "bail out" of these banks and engender severe moral hazard. However, a resolution authority to address weak banks' leverage and rollover risk would be a robust intervention also under this alternative view.
Though carefully couched in academic objectivity, this is probably the strongest internal rebuke we've read of Federal Reserve intervention during the crisis. That bank resolution is discussed at all might signal a shift in priorities at the Fed, or perhaps hint of the pressure it's come under. Or, maybe this is simply a prelude to a renewed turf battle between the lethargic FDIC and the profligate Fed. We might even entertain the notion that one or more token TBTF banks could go down. Watch out Blankfein.

Friday, May 27, 2011

Keep Your Hands Off My FaceBook, George Soros; Filter Bubbles and the New P.C. Search

I like a good TED talk. Mainly the tech and scientific ones. The social ones tend to get gummed up with statist, interventionist groupthink. [Al Gore is always in the intro--cringe.] I thought this one about online filter bubbles by Eli Pariser would be a tech one.

Eli said he was raised in the sticks of Maine. He thought the internet would bring him and everyone else in the world together. Instead, Facebook and Google are filtering our content based on what they think we want to see. Artificial reinforcement of cognitive bias is the result. Libs get search results with links to Daily Kos and Salon (just kidding, you wish Salon). Repubs can only see Palin supporters in their FaceBook feed. Okay, somewhat creepy and big brotherish.

He had me until he started talking about solutions. He said, be afraid of the cold, heartless algorithmic gatekeepers. You need human gatekeepers with ethics to monitor and direct the algos. Just like the ethical journalists of old media past. He said journalism, imperfect as it is, "got us through the last century". In fact, the mainstream media has been the perennial go-to apologist and enabler of state sanctioned murder and theft. The ethical media helped to nearly wipe us off the planet.

At this point, Eli smells like just another shill for the elite. A quick Google search confirmed my bias, as the #1 result was his paraphrased Wikipedia entry (apparently, Google knows I dig facts). He is the board president of Soros' MoveOn.org. So at least we know which power center he serves.

Eli closes with an impassioned plea to the audience, with a special shout out to Google founders "Larry and Sergei", who happen to be in the audience. Please make the internet a better place by bringing people together. Please let our ethical human gatekeepers into your PageRank TM formula. [No need to fuss with a simple "on/off filtering" toggle.] Rousing applause. Standing O.

I'd like to thank the Academy.

Sorry, but this smacks of the Fairness Doctrine. I was wondering how they would creep in control over the internet. Overt control (internet kill switch) sets off too many alarm bells (but it's still in the pipe). In the future, Search will be mandated to be socially responsible, community conscious and to celebrate diversity. In the future, Search will be less useful where it counts. Rather than impose content balancing on individual sites, the chilling effect will come top down from the largest portals.

Industrious seekers of information will still be able to self-direct their propaganda flow with some trouble. Meanwhile, the masses will be spoon fed the standard diet of oligarch-directed propaganda. Everything will be back to normal. The Google home page will be the new Walter Cronkite. Here's what to think, world.

It's the standard interventionist MO. Create a false problem. Solve it with more control by the lettered welfare overlords. Maintain the illusion of choice. In this case, the means of control of information itself are at stake.

Somewhere hot, Goebbels smiles.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Revealed: Fed Graphs of the Big Banks' Borrowings During the Crisis; Bonus: The Fed's $102 Trillion in Lending Since 2000

Over at EPJ Central, Robert Wenzel is all over the $80 billion so-called ST OMO Federal Reserve facility that took in dubious mortgage backed securities (MBS) in exchange for cash lent for 28 days. He writes:
Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Royal Bank of Scotland each borrowed at least $30 billion in 2008 from a Federal Reserve emergency lending program whose details weren’t revealed to shareholders, members of Congress or the public.

No wonder Goldman was able to withstand the panic period that took Lehman Brothers down. They were being propped up by the Fed.

The $80 billion initiative, called single-tranche open- market operations, or ST OMO, made 28-day loans from March through December 2008, a period in which confidence in global credit markets collapsed after the Sept. 15 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc,reports Bloomberg.

Units of 20 banks were required to bid at auctions for the cash. They incredibly paid interest rates as low as 0.01 percent that December, when the Fed’s main lending facility charged 0.5 percent. For a large portion of that period, the Fed Funds rate was over 2.00% Got that? Goldman and the other banksters could borrow at 0.01% and loan out in the Fed Funds market at over 2.00%. ---all in secret.
We dug through our Mark Pittman FOIA files and found the exact document used by Bloomberg and others to estimate the borrowings. Below are the relevant graphs from one "Chart Pack of Market Monitoring Metrics.pdf". There are various snapshots of this graph series in the file, some of which were emailed to Geithner himself when he was still at the NY Fed. Most interesting is one emailed on January 30, 2009, which contains the most comprehensive collection of banks, conveniently overlaid with their CDS spreads. [Would we go so far to say the Fed simply shovels money at the big banks whenever their risk trades too high? Yes.]






We can see Goldman Sachs was borrowing heavily during December, 2008. Wonder if they were among the lucky to secure the 0.01% stop-out interest rate on December 30.

A similar series from March, 2009 (look who's listed first again):



Lending cash for MBS is nothing new to the Fed, however. Below shows the Fed's temporary open market operations (also called repos) for MBS since inception of data publication in July, 2000.


All in all, $3.057 trillion in less than a decade. And this does not include Treasury and Agency lending, which bump up the total a bit to $102.067 trillion over the same time period:


To be fair, many of these operations only have a short term date, after which the money must be repaid. Some only a day later. If we eliminate the repos of nine days and under, we still have an eyewatering $28.520 trillion in lending, with an average term of 21 days:


Are we beginning to see where all that money came from that fueled the housing boom and the commodities bull market? The only reason the trend tapers off beginning in early 2008 is because the Fed switched to permanent operations, or outright purchases of securities, which are not shown.

The single tranche open market operations (ST OMO) discussed at the top are characterized by a one day forward settlement with 28 day terms, while most temporary OMOs/repos are same day settlement, either 14 or 28 day term. The regular $15 and $20 billion ST OMOs conducted from March 2008 to December 2008 totaled $840 billion, of which about $80 billion was outstanding at any given time (which is the figure used in the articles). However, there was an addition contribution of $205 billion total same day settlement MBS repos over the same time period, typically with 14 day terms. This would add about $10 billion outstanding at any time.

One final chart to zoom in from May 2007 (when MBS lending picked up again) filtered to show only MBS repos of 14 day terms and over):


The pickups in activity correlate with well-known macro disruptions, especially the Bear Stearns melt-down timeline (and the so-called quant melt-down in August, 2007). If we were investigating the Fed's lending, we might hone in on the specifics of the Fed's repo program since inception (presumably prior to the inception of data publication in July 2007). It has largely avoided scrutiny in the wake of all the new Fed programs in the last few years, yet it was the principal tool of monetary expansion during the period that led to the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression.

As ZeroHedge, notes it would also be nice to question Goldman Sachs COO Gary Cohn on why he perjured himself in front of Congress, falsely testifying that Goldman only once used another Fed facility, the discount window.

And, we're still wondering why Goldman CFO David Viniar and MD David Lehman testified that they knew nothing of AIG funds landing in the bank's private coffers when it is clear from internal Fed emails when this fact was known at the highest levels at the Fed.

Friday, April 1, 2011

NY Fed Blogs About First Bubble as it Contemplates Life Post-QE2

Another day, another hilarious post pixelated on the NY Fed's "Liberty" Street "Economics" blog (scare quotes ours). As there was no POMO today, the NYU interns decided they'd pull some paragraphs from a Charles Mackay book printed in 1852, and cobble together an entry entitled "Historical Echoes: Tulipomania—One of the Very First Financial Bubbles". Without a hint of contrition or irony, the "NY Fed Research Library" writes:
Speculative bubbles have been a recurring theme in financial history. One of the first documented market bubbles occurred in the 1600s and involved a booming (or should we say “blooming”?) tulip market in the Netherlands.

This mania was documented by Charles Mackay in his book, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, published in 1841. In addition to its accounts of alchemists, fortune-tellers, and beard taxes, the book recounts stories from the Tulipomania. One such tale follows:

"Another story is told of an English traveller, which is scarcely less ludicrous. This gentleman, an amateur botanist, happened to see a tulip-root lying in the conservatory of a wealthy Dutchman. Being ignorant of its quality, he took out his penknife, and peeled off its coats, with the view of making experiments upon it. When it was by this means reduced to half its size, he cut it into two equal sections, making all the time many learned remarks on the singular appearances of the unknown bulb. Suddenly, the owner pounced upon him, and, with fury in his eyes, asked him if he knew what he had been doing? “Peeling a most extraordinary onion,” replied the philosopher. “Hundert tausend duyvel!” said the Duchman; “it’s an Admiral Van der Eyck.” “Thank you,” replied the traveller, taking out his note-book to make a memorandum of the same; “are these admirals common in your country?” “Death and the devil!” said the Dutchman, seizing the astonished man of science by the collar; “come before the syndic, and you shall see.” In spite of his remonstrances, the traveller was led through the streets followed by a mob of persons. When brought into the presence of the magistrate, he learned, to his consternation, that the root upon which he had been experimentalising was worth four thousand florins; and, notwithstanding all he could urge in extenuation, he was lodged in prison until he found securities for the payment of this sum."

To learn more, read the Tulipomania chapter (along with other chapters on manias and bubbles) in Charles Mackay’s book, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.
We also suggest visiting this site to get a first hand look at the mechanics behind the engine of a more modern speculative bubble. Yes, the crowds do tend to get mad (either under the influence of greed or hunger) when experiencing the full gush of bank [central or otherwise] money printing.

Instead of bee-lining it for Tulip Mania (itself worth a read), we suggest (as echoed by the NY Fed) a read of Mr. Mackay's account in the first chapter of one John Law and the "Mississippi Scheme". From the establishment of a fiat credit-based currency, to introduction of government moral hazard, to backing a currency with worthless corporate stock, to abandonment of specie conversion, to capital controls...it's a riveting tale that might just sound eerily familiar. In the end, the protagonist, Mr. Law, would flee the country in disgrace, disguised as a woman. Would that the Bernank get off so easily. A considerable excerpt follows:

When Law presented himself at court he was most cordially received. He offered two memorials to the regent, in which he set forth the evils that had befallen France, owing to an insufficient currency, at different times depreciated. He asserted that a metallic currency, unaided by a paper money, was wholly inadequate to the wants of a commercial country, and particularly cited the examples of Great Britain and Holland to shew the advantages of paper. He used many sound arguments on the subject of credit, and proposed as a means of restoring that of Prance, then at so low an ebb among the nations, that he should be allowed to set up a bank, which should have the management of the royal revenues, and issue notes both on that and on landed security. He further proposed that this bank should be administered in the king’s name, but subject to the control of commissioners to be named by the States-General.

While these memorials were under consideration, Law translated into French his essay on money and trade, and used every means to extend through the nation his renown as a financier. He soon became talked of. The confidants of the regent spread abroad his praise, and every one expected great things of Monsieur Lass.6

On the 5th of May, 1716, a royal edict was published, by which Law was authorised, in conjunction with his brother, to establish a bank under the name of Law and Company, the notes of which should be received in payment of the taxes. The capital was fixed at six millions of livres, in twelve thousand shares of five hundred livres each, purchasable one fourth in specie, and the remainder in billets d’état. It was not thought expedient to grant him the whole of the privileges prayed for in his memorials until experience should have shewn their safety and advantage.

Law was now on the high road to fortune. The study of thirty years was brought to guide him in the management of his bank. He made all his notes payable at sight, and in the coin current at the time they were issued. This last was a master-stroke of policy, and immediately rendered his notes more valuable than the precious metals. The latter were constantly liable to depreciation by the unwise tampering of the government. A thousand livres of silver might be worth their nominal value one day, and be reduced one-sixth the next, but a note of Law’s bank retained its original value. He publicly declared at the same time, that a banker deserved death if he made issues without having sufficient security to answer all demands. The consequence was, that his notes advanced rapidly in public estimation, and were received at one per cent more than specie. It was not long before the trade of the country felt the benefit. Languishing commerce began to lift up her head; the taxes were paid with greater regularity and less murmuring; and a degree of confidence was established that could not fail, if it continued, to become still more advantageous. In the course of a year, Law’s notes rose to fifteen per cent premium, while the billets d’état, or notes issued by the government as security for the debts contracted by the extravagant Louis XIV., were at a discount of no less than seventy-eight and a half per cent. The comparison was too great in favour of Law not to attract the attention of the whole kingdom, and his credit extended itself day by day. Branches of his bank were almost simultaneously established at Lyons, Rochelle, Tours, Amiens, and Orleans.

The regent appears to have been utterly astonished at his success, and gradually to have conceived the idea that paper, which could so aid a metallic currency, could entirely supersede it. Upon this fundamental error he afterwards acted. In the mean time, Law commenced the famous project which has handed his name down to posterity. He proposed to the regent (who could refuse him nothing) to establish a company that should have the exclusive privilege of trading to the great river Mississippi and the province of Louisiana, on its western bank. The country was supposed to abound in the precious metals; and the company, supported by the profits of their exclusive commerce, were to be the sole farmers of the taxes and sole coiners of money. Letters patent were issued, incorporating the company, in August 1717. The capital was divided into two hundred thousand shares of five hundred livres each, the whole of which might be paid in billets d’état, at their nominal value, although worth no more than a hundred and sixty livres in the market.

It was now that the frenzy of speculating began to seize upon the nation. Law’s bank had effected so much good, that any promises for the future which he thought proper to make were readily believed. The regent every day conferred new privileges upon the fortunate projector. The bank obtained the monopoly of the sale of tobacco, the sole right of refinage of gold and silver, and was finally erected into the Royal Bank of France. Amid the intoxication of success, both Law and the regent forgot the maxim so loudly proclaimed by the former, that a banker deserved death who made issues of paper without the necessary funds to provide for them. As soon as the bank, from a private, became a public institution, the regent caused a fabrication of notes to the amount of one thousand millions of livres. This was the first departure from sound principles, and one for which Law is not justly blameable. While the affairs of the bank were under his control, the issues had never exceeded sixty millions. Whether Law opposed the inordinate increase is not known; but as it took place as soon as the bank was made a royal establishment, it is but fair to lay the blame of the change of system upon the regent.

Law found that he lived under a despotic government; but he was not yet aware of the pernicious influence which such a government could exercise upon so delicate a framework as that of credit. He discovered it afterwards to his cost, but in the meantime suffered himself to be impelled by the regent into courses which his own reason must have disapproved. With a weakness most culpable, he lent his aid in inundating the country with paper money, which, based upon no solid foundation, was sure to fall, sooner or later. The extraordinary present fortune dazzled his eyes, and prevented him from seeing the evil day that would burst over his head, when once, from any cause or other, the alarm was sounded. The parliament were from the first jealous of his influence as a foreigner, and had, besides, their misgivings as to the safety of his projects. As his influence extended, their animosity increased. D’Aguesseau, the chancellor, was unceremoniously dismissed by the regent for his opposition to the vast increase of paper money, and the constant depreciation of the gold and silver coin of the realm. This only served to augment the enmity of the parliament, and when D’Argenson, a man devoted to the interests of the regent, was appointed to the vacant chancellorship, and made at the same time minister of finance, they became more violent than ever. The first measure of the new minister caused a further depreciation of the coin. In order to extinguish the billets d’état, it was ordered that persons bringing to the mint four thousand livres in specie and one thousand livres in billets d’état, should receive back coin to the amount of five thousand livres. D’Argenson plumed himself mightily upon thus creating five thousand new and smaller livres out of the four thousand old and larger ones, being too ignorant of the true principles of trade and credit to be aware of the immense injury he was inflicting upon both.

The parliament saw at once the impolicy and danger of such a system, and made repeated remonstrances to the regent. The latter refused to entertain their petitions, when the parliament, by a bold and very unusual stretch of authority, commanded that no money should be received in payment but that of the old standard. The regent summoned a lit de justice, and annulled the decree. The parliament resisted, and issued another. Again the regent exercised his privilege, and annulled it, till the parliament, stung to fiercer opposition,passed another decree, dated August 12th, 1718, by which they forbade the bank of Law to have any concern, either direct or indirect, in the administration of the revenue; and prohibited all foreigners, under heavy penalties, from interfering, either in their own names, or in that of others, in the management of the finances of the state. The parliament considered Law to be the author of all the evil, and some of the councillors, in the virulence of their enmity, proposed that he should be brought to trial, and, if found guilty, be hung at the gates of the Palais de Justice.

Exterior of a palace.

PALAIS ROYAL FROM THE GARDEN.

Law, in great alarm, fled to the Palais Royal, and threw himself on the protection of the regent, praying that measures might be taken to reduce the parliament to obedience. The regent had nothing so much at heart, both on that account and because of the disputes that had arisen relative to the legitimation of the Duke of Maine and the Count of Thoulouse, the sons of the late king. The parliament was ultimately overawed by the arrest of their president and two of the councillors, who were sent to distant prisons.

Thus the first cloud upon Law’s prospects blew over: freed from apprehension of personal danger, he devoted his attention to his famous Mississippi project, the shares of which were rapidly rising, in spite of the parliament. At the commencement of the year 1719, an edict was published, granting to the Mississippi Company the exclusive privilege of trading to the East Indies, China, and the South Seas, and to all the possessions of the French East India Company, established by Colbert. The Company, in consequence of this great increase of their business, assumed, as more appropriate, the title of Company of the Indies, and created fifty thousand new shares. The prospects now held out by Law were most magnificent. He promised a yearly dividend of two hundred livres upon each share of five hundred, which, as the shares were paid for in billets d’état at their nominal value, but worth only 100 livres, was at the rate of about 120 per cent profit.

A street with many people on it.

LAW’S HOUSE; RUE DE QUINCAMPOIX.

The public enthusiasm, which had been so long rising, could not resist a vision so splendid. At least three hundred thousand applications were made for the fifty thousand new shares, and Law’s house in the Rue de Quincampoix was beset from morning to night by the eager applicants. As it was impossible to satisfy them all, it was several weeks before a list of the fortunate new stockholders could be made out, during which time the public impatience rose to a pitch of frenzy. Dukes, marquises, counts, with their duchesses, marchionesses, and countesses, waited in the streets for hours every day before Mr. Law’s door to know the result. At last, to avoid the jostling of the plebeian crowd, which, to the number of thousands, filled the whole thoroughfare, they took apartments in the adjoining houses, that they might be continually near the temple whence the new Plutus was diffusing wealth. Every day the value of the old shares increased, and the fresh applications, induced by the golden dreams of the whole nation, became so numerous that it was deemed advisable to create no less than three hundred thousand new shares, at five thousand livres each, in order that the regent might take advantage of the popular enthusiasm to pay off the national debt. For this purpose, the sum of fifteen hundred millions of livres was necessary. Such was the eagerness of the nation, that thrice the sum would have been subscribed if the government had authorised it.

Law was now at the zenith of his prosperity, and the people were rapidly approaching the zenith of their infatuation. The highest and the lowest classes were alike filled with a vision of boundless wealth. There was not a person of note among the aristocracy, with the exception of the Duke of St. Simon and Marshal Villars, who was not engaged in buying or selling stock. People of every age and sex and condition in life speculated in the rise and fall of the Mississippi bonds. The Rue de Quincampoix was the grand resort of the jobbers, and it being a narrow, inconvenient street, accidents continually occurred in it, from the tremendous pressure of the crowd. Houses in it, worth, in ordinary times, a thousand livres of yearly rent, yielded as much as twelve or sixteen thousand. A cobbler, who had a stall in it, gained about two hundred livres a day by letting it out, and furnishing writing materials to brokers and their clients. The story goes, that a hunchbacked man who stood in the street gained considerable sums by lending his hump as a writing-desk to the eager speculators! The great concourse of persons who assembled to do business brought a still greater concourse of spectators. These again drew all the thieves and immoral characters of Paris to the spot, and constant riots and disturbances took place. At nightfall, it was often found necessary to send a troop of soldiers to clear the street.

A crowd. A man writes upon a tablet resting on a hunchback's back.

THE HUNCHBACK.

Law, finding the inconvenience of his residence, removed to the Place Vendôme, whither the crowd of agioteurs followed him. That spacious square soon became as thronged as the Rue de Quincampoix: from morning to night it presented the appearance of a fair. Booths and tents were erected for the transaction of business and the sale of refreshments, and gamblers with their roulette tables stationed themselves in the very middle of the place, and reaped a golden, or rather a paper, harvest from the throng. The boulevards and public gardens were forsaken; parties of pleasure took their walks in preference in the Place Vendôme, which became the fashionable lounge of the idle, as well as the general rendezvous of the busy. The noise was so great all day, that the chancellor, whose court was situated in the square, complained to the regent and the municipality, that he could not hear the advocates. Law, when applied to, expressed his willingness to aid in the removal of the nuisance, and for this purpose entered into a treaty with the Prince de Carignan for the Hôtel de Soissons, which had a garden of several acres in the rear. A bargain was concluded, by which Law became the purchaser of the hotel at an enormous price, the prince reserving to himself the magnificent gardens as a new source of profit. They contained some fine statues and several fountains, and were altogether laid out with much taste. As soon as Law was installed in his new abode, an edict was published, forbidding all persons to buy or sell stock any where but in the gardens of the Hôtel de Soissons. In the midst, among the trees, about five hundred small tents and pavilions were erected, for the convenience of the stock-jobbers. Their various colours, the gay ribands and banners which floated from them, the busy crowds which passed continually in and out—the incessant hum of voices, the noise, the music, and the strange mixture of business and pleasure on the countenances of the throng, all combined to give the place an air of enchantment that quite enraptured the Parisians. The Prince de Carignan made enormous profits while the delusion lasted. Each tent was let at the rate of five hundred livres a month; and, as there were at least five hundred of them, his monthly revenue from this source alone must have amounted to 250,000 livres, or upwards of 10,000l. sterling.

Exterior view of a hotel.

HOTEL DE SOISSONS.

The honest old soldier, Marshal Villars, was so vexed to see the folly which had smitten his countrymen, that he never could speak with temper on the subject. Passing one day through the Place Vendôme in his carriage, the choleric gentleman was so annoyed at the infatuation of the people, that he abruptly ordered his coachman to stop, and, putting his head out of the carriage window, harangued them for full half an hour on their “disgusting avarice.” This was not a very wise proceeding on his part. Hisses and shouts of laughter resounded from every side, and jokes without number were aimed at him. There being at last strong symptoms that something more tangible was flying through the air in the direction of his head, the marshal was glad to drive on. He never again repeated the experiment.

Two sober, quiet, and philosophic men of letters, M. de la Motte and the Abbé Terrason, congratulated each other, that they, at least, were free from this strange infatuation. A few days afterwards, as the worthy abbé was coming out of the Hôtel de Soissons, whither he had gone to buy shares in the Mississippi, whom should he see but his friend La Motte entering for the same purpose. “Ha!” said the abbé smiling, “is that you?” “Yes,” said La Motte, pushing past him as fast as he was able; “and can that be you?” The next time the two scholars met, they talked of philosophy, of science, and of religion, but neither had courage for a long time to breathe one syllable about the Mississippi. At last, when it was mentioned, they agreed that a man ought never to swear against his doing any one thing, and that there was no sort of extravagance of which even a wise man was not capable.

During this time, Law, the new Plutus, had become all at once the most important personage of the state. The ante-chambers of the regent were forsaken by the courtiers, Peers, judges, and bishops thronged to the Hôtel de Soissons; officers of the army and navy, ladies of title and fashion, and every one to whom hereditary rank or public employ gave a claim to precedence, were to be found waiting in his ante-chambers to beg for a portion of his India stock. Law was so pestered that he was unable to see one-tenth part of the applicants, and every manœuvre that ingenuity could suggest was employed to gain access to him. Peers, whose dignity would have been outraged if the regent had made them wait half an hour for an interview, were content to wait six hours for the chance of seeing Monsieur Law. Enormous fees were paid to his servants, if they would merely announce their names. Ladies of rank employed the blandishments of their smiles for the same object; but many of them came day after day for a fortnight before they could obtain an audience. When Law accepted an invitation, he was sometimes so surrounded by ladies, all asking to have their names put down in his lists as shareholders in the new stock, that, in spite of his well-known and habitual gallantry, he was obliged to tear himself away par force. The most ludicrous stratagems were employed to have an opportunity of speaking to him. One lady, who had striven in vain during several days, gave up in despair all attempts to see him at his own house, but ordered her coachman to keep a strict watch whenever she was out in her carriage, and if he saw Mr. Law coming, to drive against a post and upset her. The coachman promised obedience, and for three days the lady was driven incessantly through the town, praying inwardly for the opportunity to be overturned. At last she espied Mr. Law, and, pulling the string, called out to the coachman, “Upset us now! for God’s sake, upset us now!” The coachman drove against a post, the lady screamed, the coach was overturned, and Law, who had seen the accident, hastened to the spot to render assistance. The cunning dame was led into the Hôtel de Soissons, where she soon thought it advisable to recover from her fright, and, after apologising to Mr. Law, confessed her stratagem. Law smiled, and entered the lady in his books as the purchaser of a quantity of India stock. Another story is told of a Madame de Boucha, who, knowing that Mr. Law was at dinner at a certain house, proceeded thither in her carriage, and gave the alarm of fire. The company started from table, and Law among the rest; but, seeing one lady making all haste into the house towards him, while every body else was scampering away, he suspected the trick, and ran off in another direction.

A man helps a woman from a wrecked carriage.

Many other anecdotes are related, which even though they may be a little exaggerated, are nevertheless worth preserving, as shewing the spirit of that singular period.7 The regent was one day mentioning, in the presence of D’Argenson, the Abbé Dubois, and some other persons, that he was desirous of deputing some lady, of the rank at least of a duchess, to attend upon his daughter at Modena; “but,” added he, “I do not exactly know where to find one.” “No!” replied one, in affected surprise; “I can tell you where to find every duchess in France: you have only to go to Mr. Law’s; you will see them every one in his ante-chamber.”

M. de Chirac, a celebrated physician, had bought stock at an unlucky period, and was very anxious to sell out. Stock, however, continued to fall for two or three days, much to his alarm. His mind was filled with the subject, when he was suddenly called upon to attend a lady who imagined herself unwell. He arrived, was shewn up stairs, and felt the lady’s pulse. “It falls! it falls! good God! it falls continually!” said he musingly, while the lady looked up in his face all anxiety for his opinion. “Oh, M. de Chirac,” said she, starting to her feet and ringing the bell for assistance; “I am dying! I am dying! it falls! it falls! it falls!” “What falls?” inquired the doctor in amazement. “My pulse! my pulse!” said the lady; “I must be dying.” “Calm your apprehensions, my dear madam,” said M. de Chirac; “I was speaking of the stocks. The truth is, I have been a great loser, and my mind is so disturbed, I hardly know what I have been saying.”

The price of shares sometimes rose ten or twenty per cent in the course of a few hours, and many persons in the humbler walks of life, who had risen poor in the morning, went to bed in affluence. An extensive holder of stock, being taken ill, sent his servant to sell two hundred and fifty shares, at eight thousand livres each, the price at which they were then quoted. The servant went, and, on his arrival in the Jardin de Soissons, found that in the interval the price had risen to ten thousand livres. The difference of two thousand livres on the two hundred and fifty shares, amounting to 500,000 livres, or 20,000l. sterling, he very coolly transferred to his own use, and giving the remainder to his master, set out the same evening for another country. Law’s coachman in a very short time made money enough to set up a carriage of his own, and requested permission to leave his service. Law, who esteemed the man, begged of him as a favour, that he would endeavour, before he went, to find a substitute as good as himself. The coachman consented, and in the evening brought two of his former comrades, telling Mr. Law to choose between them, and he would take the other. Cookmaids and footmen were now and then as lucky, and, in the full-blown pride of their easily-acquired wealth, made the most ridiculous mistakes. Preserving the language and manners of their old, with the finery of their new station, they afforded continual subjects for the pity of the sensible, the contempt of the sober, and the laughter of every body. But the folly and meanness of the higher ranks of society were still more disgusting. One instance alone, related by the Duke de St. Simon, will shew the unworthy avarice which infected the whole of society. A man of the name of André, without character or education, had, by a series of well-timed speculations in Mississippi bonds, gained enormous wealth in an incredibly short space of time. As St. Simon expresses it, “he had amassed mountains of gold.” As he became rich, he grew ashamed of the lowness of his birth, and anxious above all things to be allied to nobility. He had a daughter, an infant only three years of age, and he opened a negotiation with the aristocratic and needy family of D’Oyse, that this child should, upon certain conditions, marry a member of that house. The Marquis D’Oyse, to his shame, consented, and promised to marry her himself on her attaining the age of twelve, if the father would pay him down the sum of a hundred thousand crowns, and twenty thousand livres every year until the celebration of the marriage. The marquis was himself in his thirty-third year. This scandalous bargain was duly signed and sealed, the stockjobber furthermore agreeing to settle upon his daughter, on the marriage-day, a fortune of several millions. The Duke of Brancas, the head of the family, was present throughout the negotiation, and shared in all the profits. St. Simon, who treats the matter with the levity becoming what he thought so good a joke, adds, “that people did not spare their animadversions on this beautiful marriage,” and further informs us, “that the project fell to the ground some months afterwards by the overthrow of Law, and the ruin of the ambitious Monsieur André.” It would appear, however, that the noble family never had the honesty to return the hundred thousand crowns.

Amid events like these, which, humiliating though they be, partake largely of the ludicrous, others occurred of a more serious nature. Robberies in the streets were of daily occurrence, in consequence of the immense sums, in paper, which people carried about with them. Assassinations were also frequent. One case in particular fixed the attention of the whole of France, not only on account of the enormity of the offence, but of the rank and high connexions of the criminal.

Two men knife a third.

The Count d’Horn, a younger brother of the Prince d’Horn, and related to the noble families of D’Aremberg, De Ligne, and De Montmorency, was a young man of dissipated character, extravagant to a degree, and unprincipled as he was extravagant. In connexion with two other young men as reckless as himself, named Mille, a Piedmontese captain, and one Destampes, or Lestang, a Fleming, he formed a design to rob a very rich broker, who was known, unfortunately for himself, to carry great sums about his person. The count pretended a desire to purchase of him a number of shares in the Company of the Indies, and for that purpose appointed to meet him in a cabaret, or low public-house, in the neighbourhood of the Place Vendôme. The unsuspecting broker was punctual to his appointment; so were the Count d’Horn and his two associates, whom he introduced as his particular friends. After a few moments’ conversation, the Count d’Horn suddenly sprang upon his victim, and stabbed him three times in the breast with a poniard. The man fell heavily to the ground, and, while the count was employed in rifling his portfolio of bonds in the Mississippi and Indian schemes to the amount of one hundred thousand crowns, Mille, the Piedmontese, stabbed the unfortunate broker again and again, to make sure of his death, But the broker did not fall without a struggle, and his cries brought the people of thecabaret to his assistance. Lestang, the other assassin, who had been set to keep watch at a staircase, sprang from a window and escaped; but Mille and the Count d’Horn were seized in the very act.

This crime, committed in open day, and in so public a place as a cabaret, filled Paris with consternation. The trial of the assassins commenced on the following day; and the evidence being so clear, they were both found guilty, and condemned, to be broken alive on the wheel. The noble relatives of the Count d’Horn absolutely blocked tip the ante-chambers of the regent, praying for mercy on the misguided youth, and alleging that he was insane. The regent avoided them as long as possible, being determined that, in a case so atrocious, justice should take its course. But the importunity of these influential suitors was not to be overcome so silently; and they at last forced themselves into the presence of the regent, and prayed him to save their house the shame of a public execution. They hinted that the Princes d’Horn were allied to the illustrious family of Orleans; and added, that the regent himself would be disgraced if a kinsman of his should die by the hands of a common executioner. The regent, to his credit, was proof against all their solicitations, and replied to their last argument in the words of Corneille:

“Le crime fait la honte, et non pas l’échafaud:”

adding, that whatever shame there might be in the punishment he would very willingly share with the other relatives. Day after day they renewed their entreaties, but always with the same result. At last they thought, that if they could interest the Duke de St. Simon in their favour—a man, for whom the regent felt sincere esteem—they might succeed in their object. The duke, a thorough aristocrat, was as shocked as they were that a noble assassin should die by the same death as a plebeian felon, and represented to the regent the impolicy of making enemies of so numerous, wealthy, and powerful a family. He urged, too, that in Germany, where the family of D’Aremberg had large possessions, it was the law, that no relative of a person broken on the wheel could succeed to any public office or employ until a whole generation had passed away. For this reason, he thought the punishment of the guilty count might be transmuted into beheading, which was considered all over Europe as much less infamous. The regent was moved by this argument, and was about to consent, when Law, who felt peculiarly interested in the fate of the murdered man, confirmed him in his former resolution to let the law take its course.

The relatives of D’Horn were now reduced to the last extremity. The Prince de Robec Montmorency, despairing of other methods, found means to penetrate into the dungeon of the criminal, and offering him a cup of poison, implored him to save them from disgrace. The Count d’Horn turned away his head, and refused to take it. Montmorency pressed him once more; and losing all patience at his continued refusal, turned on his heel, and exclaiming, “Die, then, as thou wilt, mean-spirited wretch! thou art fit only to perish by the hands of the hangman!” left him to his fate.

D’Horn himself petitioned the regent that he might be beheaded; but Law, who exercised more influence over his mind than any other person, with the exception of the notorious Abbé Dubois, his tutor, insisted that he could not in justice succumb to the self-interested views of the D’Horns. The regent had from the first been of the same opinion; and within six days after the commission of their crime, D’Horn and Mille were broken on the wheel in the Place de Grève. The other assassin, Lestang, was never apprehended.

This prompt and severe justice was highly pleasing to the populace of Paris. Even M. de Quincampoix, as they called Law, came in for a share of their approbation for having induced the regent to shew no favour to a patrician. But the number of robberies and assassinations did not diminish; no sympathy was shewn for rich jobbers when they were plundered. The general laxity of public morals, conspicuous enough before, was rendered still more so by its rapid pervasion of the middle classes, who had hitherto remained comparatively pure between the open vices of the class above and the hidden crimes of the class below them. The pernicious love of gambling diffused itself through society, and bore all public and nearly all private virtue before it.

For a time, while confidence lasted, an impetus was given to trade which could not fail to be beneficial. In Paris especially the good results were felt. Strangers flocked into the capital from every part, bent not only upon making money, but on spending it. The Duchess of Orleans, mother of the regent, computes the increase of the population during this time, from the great influx of strangers from all parts of the world, at 305,000 souls. The housekeepers were obliged to make up beds in garrets, kitchens, and even stables, for the accommodation of lodgers; and the town was so full of carriages and vehicles of every description, that they were obliged, in the principal streets, to drive at a foot-pace for fear of accidents. The looms of the country worked with unusual activity to supply rich laces, silks, broad-cloth, and velvets, which being paid for in abundant paper, increased in price four-fold. Provisions shared the general advance. Bread, meat, and vegetables were sold at prices greater than had ever before been known; while the wages of labour rose in exactly the same proportion. The artisan who formerly gained fifteen sous per diem now gained sixty. New houses were built in every direction; an illusory prosperity shone over the land, and so dazzled the eyes of the whole nation, that none could see the dark cloud on the horizon announcing the storm that was too rapidly approaching.

Law himself, the magician whose wand had wrought so surprising a change, shared, of course, in the general prosperity. His wife and daughter were courted by the highest nobility, and their alliance sought by the heirs of ducal and princely houses. He bought two splendid estates in different parts of France, and entered into a negotiation with the family of the Duke de Sully for the purchase of the marquisate of Rosny. His religion being an obstacle to his advancement, the regent promised, if he would publicly conform to the Catholic faith, to make him comptroller-general of the finances. Law, who had no more real religion than any other professed gambler, readily agreed, and was confirmed by the Abbé de Tencin in the cathedral of Melun, in presence of a great crowd of spectators8. On the following day he was elected honorary churchwarden of the parish of St. Roch, upon which occasion he made it a present of the sum of five hundred thousand livres. His charities, always magnificent, were not always so ostentatious. He gave away great sums privately, and no tale of real distress ever reached his ears in vain.

At this time he was by far the most influential person of the state. The Duke of Orleans had so much confidence in his sagacity and the success of his plans, that he always consulted him upon every matter of moment. He was by no means unduly elevated by his prosperity, but remained the same simple, affable, sensible man that he had shewn himself in adversity. His gallantry, which was always delightful to the fair objects of it, was of a nature so kind, so gentlemanly, and so respectful, that not even a lover could have taken offence at it. If upon any occasion he shewed any symptoms of haughtiness, it was to the cringing nobles who lavished their adulation upon him till it became fulsome. He often took pleasure in seeing how long he could make them dance attendance upon him for a single favour. To such of his own countrymen as by chance visited Paris, and sought an interview with him, he was, on the contrary, all politeness and attention. When Archibald Campbell, Earl of Islay, and afterwards Duke of Argyle, called upon him in the Place Vendôme, he had to pass through an ante-chamber crowded with persons of the first distinction, all anxious to see the great financier, and have their names put down as first on the list of some new subscription. Law himself was quietly sitting in his library, writing a letter to the gardener at his paternal estate of Lauriston about the planting of some cabbages! The earl stayed for a considerable time, played a game of piquet with his countryman, and left him, charmed with his ease, good sense, and good breeding.

Law holds 'Laudo Britannos' on his shoulders.

LAW AS ATLAS.9

Among the nobles who, by means of the public credulity at this time, gained sums sufficient to repair their ruined fortunes, may be mentioned the names of the Dukes de Bourbon, de Guiche, de la Force,10 de Chaulnes, and d’Antin; the Marechal d’Estrées; the Princes de Rohan, de Poix, and de Léon. The Duke de Bourbon, son of Louis XIV. by Madame de Montespan, was peculiarly fortunate in his speculations in Mississippi paper. He rebuilt the royal residence of Chantilly in a style of unwonted magnificence; and being passionately fond of horses, he erected a range of stables, which were long renowned throughout Europe, and imported a hundred and fifty of the finest racers from England to improve the breed in France. He bought a large extent of country in Picardy, and became possessed of nearly all the valuable lands lying between the Oise and the Somme.

When fortunes such as these were gained, it is no wonder that Law should have been almost worshipped by the mercurial population. Never was monarch more flattered than he was. All the small poets and littérateurs of the day poured floods of adulation upon him. According to them, he was the saviour of the country, the tutelary divinity of France; wit was in all his words, goodness in all his looks, and wisdom in all his actions. So great a crowd followed his carriage whenever he went abroad, that the regent sent him a troop of horse as his permanent escort to clear the streets before him.

It was remarked at this time that Paris had never before been so full of objects of elegance and luxury. Statues, pictures, and tapestries were imported in great quantities from foreign countries, and found a ready market. All those pretty trifles in the way of furniture and ornament which the French excel in manufacturing were no longer the exclusive playthings of the aristocracy, but were to be found in abundance in the houses of traders and the middle classes in general. Jewellery of the most costly description was brought to Paris as the most favourable mart; among the rest, the famous diamond bought by the regent, and called by his name, and which long adorned the crown of France. It was purchased for the sum of two millions of livres, under circumstances which shew that the regent was not so great a gainer as some of his subjects by the impetus which trade had received. When the diamond was first offered to him, he refused to buy it, although he desired above all things to possess it, alleging as his reason, that his duty to the country he governed would not allow him to spend so large a sum of the public money for a mere jewel. This valid and honourable excuse threw all the ladies of the court into alarm, and nothing was heard for some days but expressions of regret that so rare a gem should be allowed to go out of France, no private individual being rich enough to buy it. The regent was continually importuned about it, but all in vain, until the Duke de St. Simon, who with all his ability was something of a twaddler, undertook the weighty business. His entreaties being seconded by Law, the good-natured regent gave his consent, leaving to Law’s ingenuity to find the means to pay for it. The owner took security for the payment of the sum of two millions of livres within a stated period, receiving in the mean time the interest of five per cent upon that amount, and being allowed, besides, all the valuable clippings of the gem. St. Simon, in his Memoirs, relates with no little complacency his share in this transaction. After describing the diamond to be as large as a greengage, of a form nearly round, perfectly white, and without flaw, and weighing more than five hundred grains, he concludes with a chuckle, by telling the world “that he takes great credit to himself for having induced the regent to make so illustrious a purchase.” In other words, he was proud that he had induced him to sacrifice his duty, and buy a bauble for himself at an extravagant price out of the public money.

Thus the system continued to flourish till the commencement of the year 1720. The warnings of the parliament, that too great a creation of paper money would, sooner or later, bring the country to bankruptcy, were disregarded. The regent, who knew nothing whatever of the philosophy of finance, thought that a system which had produced such good effects could never be carried to excess. If five hundred millions of paper had been of such advantage, five hundred millions additional would be of still greater advantage. This was the grand error of the regent, and which Law did not attempt to dispel. The extraordinary avidity of the people kept up the delusion; and the higher the price of Indian and Mississippi stock, the morebillets de banque were issued to keep pace with it. The edifice thus reared might not unaptly be compared to the gorgeous palace erected by Potemkin, that princely barbarian of Russia, to surprise and please his imperial mistress: huge blocks of ice were piled one upon another; ionic pillars, of chastest workmanship, in ice, formed a noble portico; and a dome, of the same material, shone in the sun, which had just strength enough to gild, but not to melt it. It glittered afar, like a palace of crystals and diamonds; but there came one warm breeze from the south, and the stately building dissolved away, till none were able even to gather up the fragments. So with Law and his paper system. No sooner did the breath of popular mistrust blow steadily upon it, than it fell to ruins, and none could raise it up again.

The first slight alarm that was occasioned was early in 1720. The Prince de Conti, offended that Law should have denied him fresh shares in India stock, at his own price, sent to his bank to demand payment in specie of so enormous a quantity of notes, that three wagons were required for its transport. Law complained to the regent, and urged on his attention the mischief that would be done, if such an example found many imitators. The regent was but too well aware of it, and, sending for the Prince de Conti, ordered him, under penalty of his high displeasure, to refund to the bank two-thirds of the specie which he had withdrawn from it. The prince was forced to obey the despotic mandate. Happily for Law’s credit, De Conti was an unpopular man: every body condemned his meanness and cupidity, and agreed that Law had been hardly treated. It is strange, however, that so narrow an escape should not have made both Law and the regent more anxious to restrict their issues. Others were soon found who imitated, from motives of distrust, the example which had been set by De Conti in revenge. The more acute stockjobbers imagined justly that prices could not continue to rise for ever. Bourdon and La Richardière, renowned for their extensive operations in the funds, quietly and in small quantities at a time, converted their notes into specie, and sent it away to foreign countries. They also bought as much as they could conveniently carry of plate and expensive jewellery, and sent it secretly away to England or to Holland. Vermalet, a jobber, who sniffed the coming storm, procured gold and silver coin to the amount of nearly a million of livres, which he packed in a farmer’s cart, and covered over with hay and cow-dung. He then disguised himself in the dirty smock-frock, or blouse, of a peasant, and drove his precious load in safety into Belgium. From thence he soon found means to transport it to Amsterdam.

Hitherto no difficulty had been experienced by any class in procuring specie for their wants. But this system could not long be carried on without causing a scarcity. The voice of complaint was heard on every side, and inquiries being instituted, the cause was soon discovered. The council debated long on the remedies to be taken, and Law, being called on for his advice, was of opinion, that an edict should be published, depreciating the value of coin five per cent below that of paper. The edict was published accordingly; but failing of its intended effect, was followed by another, in which the depreciation was increased to ten per cent. The payments of the bank were at the same time restricted to one hundred livres in gold, andten in silver. All these measures were nugatory to restore confidence in the paper, though the restriction of cash payments within limits so extremely narrow kept up the credit of the bank.

Law surrounded by comic figures.

LUCIFER’S NEW ROW-BARGE.11

Notwithstanding every effort to the contrary, the precious metals continued to be conveyed to England and Holland. The little coin that was left in the country was carefully treasured, or hidden until the scarcity became so great, that the operations of trade could no longer be carried on. In this emergency, Law hazarded the bold experiment of forbidding the use of specie altogether. In February 1720 an edict was published, which, instead of restoring the credit of the paper, as was intended, destroyed it irrecoverably, and drove the country to the very brink of revolution. By this famous edict it was forbidden to any person whatever to have more than five hundred livres (20l.) of coin in his possession, under pain of a heavy fine, and confiscation of the sums found. It was also forbidden to buy up jewellery, plate, and precious stones, and informers were encouraged to make search for offenders, by the promise of one-half the amount they might discover. The whole country sent up a cry of distress at this unheard-of tyranny. The most odious persecution daily took place. The privacy of families was violated by the intrusion of informers and their agents. The most virtuous and honest were denounced for the crime of having been seen with a louis d’or in their possession. Servants betrayed their masters, one citizen became a spy upon his neighbour, and arrests and confiscations so multiplied, that the courts found a difficulty in getting through the immense increase of business thus occasioned. It was sufficient for an informer to say that he suspected any person of concealing money in his house, and immediately’a search-warrant was granted. Lord Stair, the English ambassador, said, that it was now impossible to doubt of the sincerity of Law’s conversion to the Catholic religion; he had established the inquisition, after having given abundant evidence of his faith in transubstantiation, by turning so much gold into paper.

Every epithet that popular hatred could suggest was showered upon the regent and the unhappy Law. Coin, to any amount above five hundred livres, was an illegal tender, and nobody would take paper if he could help it. No one knew to-day what his notes would be worth to-morrow. “Never,” says Duclos, in his Secret Memoirs of the Regency, “was seen a more capricious government—never was a more frantic tyranny exercised by hands less firm. It is inconceivable to those who were witnesses of the horrors of those times, and who look back upon them now as on a dream, that a sudden revolution did not break out—that Law and the regent did not perish by a tragical death. They were both held in horror, but the people confined themselves to complaints; a sombre and timid despair, a stupid consternation, had seized upon all, and men’s minds were too vile even to be capable of a courageous crime.” It would appear that, a one time, a movement of the people was organised. Seditious writings were posted up against the walls, and were sent, in hand-bills, to the houses of the most conspicuous people. One of them, given in the Mémoires de la Régence, was to the following effect:—“Sir and madam,—This is to give you notice that a St. Bartholomew’s Day will be enacted again on Saturday and Sunday, if affairs do not alter. You are desired not to stir out, nor you, nor your servants. God preserve you from the flames! Give notice to your neighbours. Dated, Saturday, May 25th, 1720.” The immense number of spies with which the city was infested rendered the people mistrustful of one another, and beyond some trifling disturbances made in the evening by an insignificant group, which was soon dispersed, the peace of the capital was not compromised.

Villagers with picks and shovels.

The value of shares in the Louisiana, or Mississippi stock, had fallen very rapidly, and few indeed were found to believe the tales that had once been told of the immense wealth of that region. A last effort was therefore tried to restore the public confidence in the Mississippi project. For this purpose, a general conscription of all the poor wretches in Paris was made by order of government. Upwards of six thousand of the very refuse of the population were impressed, as if in time of war, and were provided with clothes and tools to be embarked for New Orleans, to work in the gold mines alleged to abound there. They were paraded day after day through the streets with their pikes and shovels, and then sent off in small detachments to the out-ports to be shipped for America. Two-thirds of them never reached their destination, but dispersed themselves over the country, sold their tools for what they could get, and returned to their old course of life. In less than three weeks afterwards, one-half of them were to be found again in Paris. The manœuvre, however, caused a trifling advance in Mississippi stock. Many persons of superabundant gullibility believed that operations had begun in earnest in the new Golconda, and that gold and silver ingots would again be found in France.

In a constitutional monarchy some surer means would have been found for the restoration of public credit. In England, at a subsequent period, when a similar delusion had brought on similar distress, how different were the measures taken to repair the evil; but in France, unfortunately, the remedy was left to the authors of the mischief. The arbitrary will of the regent, which endeavoured to extricate the country, only plunged it deeper into the mire. All payments were ordered to be made in paper, and between the 1st of February and the end of May, notes were fabricated to the amount of upwards of 1500 millions of livres, or 60,000,000l. sterling. But the alarm once sounded, no art could make the people feel the slightest confidence in paper which was not exchangeable into metal. M. Lambert, the president of the parliament of Paris, told the regent to his face that he would rather have a hundred thousand livres in gold or silver than five millions in the notes of his bank. When such was the general feeling, the superabundant issues of paper but increased the evil, by rendering still more enormous the disparity between the amount of specie and notes in circulation. Coin, which it was the object of the regent to depreciate, rose in value on every fresh attempt to diminish it. In February, it was judged advisable that the Royal Bank should be incorporated with the Company of the Indies. An edict to that effect was published and registered by the parliament. The state remained the guarantee for the notes of the bank, and no more were to be issued without an order in council. All the profits of the bank, since the time it had been taken out of Law’s hands and made a national institution, were given over by the regent to the Company of the Indies. This measure had the effect of raising for a short time the value of the Louisiana and other shares of the company, but it failed in placing public credit on any permanent basis.

A council of state was held in the beginning of May, at which Law, D’Argenson (his colleague in the administration of the finances), and all the ministers were present. It was then computed that the total amount of notes in circulation was 2600 millions of livres, while the coin in the country was not quite equal to half that amount. It was evident to the majority of the council that some plan must be adopted to equalise the currency. Some proposed that the notes should be reduced to the value of the specie, while others proposed that the nominal value of the specie should be raised till it was on an equality with the paper. Law is said to have opposed both these projects, but failing in suggesting any other, it was agreed that the notes should be depreciated one half. On the 21st of May, an edict was accordingly issued, by which it was decreed that the shares of the Company of the Indies, and the notes of the bank, should gradually diminish in value, till at the end of a year they should only pass current for one-half of their nominal worth. The parliament refused to register the edict—the greatest outcry was excited, and the state of the country became so alarming, that, as the only means of preserving tranquillity, the council of the regency was obliged to stultify its own proceedings, by publishing within seven days another edict, restoring the notes to their original value.

On the same day (the 27th of May) the bank stopped payment in specie. Law and D’Argenson were both dismissed from the ministry. The weak, vacillating, and cowardly regent threw the blame of all the mischief upon Law, who, upon presenting himself at the Palais Royal, was refused admittance. At nightfall, however, he was sent for, and admitted into the palace by a secret door,12 when the regent endeavoured to console him, and made all manner of excuses for the severity with which in public he had been compelled to treat him. So capricious was his conduct, that, two days afterwards, he took him publicly to the opera, where he sat in the royal box alongside of the regent, who treated him with marked consideration in face of all the people. But such was the hatred against Law that the experiment had well nigh proved fatal to him. The mob assailed his carriage with stones just as he was entering his own door; and if the coachman had not made a sudden jerk into the court-yard, and the domestics closed the gate immediately, he would, in all probability, have been dragged out and torn to pieces. On the following day, his wife and daughter were also assailed by the mob as they were returning in their carriage from the races. When the regent was informed of these occurrences he sent Law a strong detachment of Swiss guards, who were stationed night and day in the court of his residence. The public indignation at last increased so much, that Law, finding his own house, even with this guard, insecure, took refuge in the Palais Royal, in the apartments of the regent.

The Chancellor, D’Aguesseau, who had been dismissed in 1718 for his opposition to the projects of Law, was now recalled to aid in the restoration of credit. The regent acknowledged too late, that he had treated with unjustifiable harshness and mistrust one of the ablest, and perhaps the sole honest public man of that corrupt period. He had retired ever since his disgrace to his country house at Fresnes, where, in the midst of severe but delightful philosophic studies, he had forgotten the intrigues of an unworthy court. Law himself, and the Chevalier de Conflans, a gentleman of the regent’s household, were despatched in a post-chaise with orders to bring the ex-chancellor to Paris along with them. D’Aguesseau consented to render what assistance he could, contrary to the advice of his friends, who did not approve that he should accept any recal to office of which Law was the bearer. On his arrival in Paris, five counsellors of the parliament were admitted to confer with the Commissary of Finance; and on the 1st of June an order was published abolishing the law which made it criminal to amass coin to the amount of more than five hundred livres. Every one was permitted to have as much specie as he pleased. In order that the bank-notes might be withdrawn, twenty-five millions of new notes were created, on the security of the revenues of the city of Paris, at two-and-a-half per cent. The bank-notes withdrawn were publicly burned in front of the Hôtel de Ville. The new notes were principally of the value of ten livres each; and on the 10th of June the bank was re-opened, with a sufficiency of silver coin to give in change for them.

A head-and-shoulders portait.

D’AGUESSEAU.

These measures were productive of considerable advantage. All the population of Paris hastened to the bank to get coin for their small notes; and silver becoming scarce, they were paid in copper. Very few complained that this was too heavy, although poor fellows might be continually seen toiling and sweating along the streets, laden with more than they could comfortably carry, in the shape of change for fifty livres. The crowds around the bank were so great, that hardly a day passed that some one was not pressed to death. On the 9th of July, the multitude was so dense and clamorous that the guards stationed at the entrance of the Mazarin Gardens closed the gate and refused to admit any more. The crowd became incensed, and flung stones through the railings upon the soldiers. The latter, incensed in their turn, threatened to fire upon the people. At that instant one of them was hit by a stone, and, taking up his piece, he fired into the crowd. One man fell dead immediately, and another was severely wounded. It was every instant expected that a general attack would have been commenced upon the bank; but the gates of the Mazarin Gardens being opened to the crowd, who saw a whole troop of soldiers, with their bayonets fixed ready to receive them, they contented themselves by giving vent to their indignation in groans and hisses.

Eight days afterwards the concourse of people was so tremendous that fifteen persons were squeezed to death at the doors of the bank. The people were so indignant that they took three of the bodies on stretchers before them, and proceeded, to the number of seven or eight thousand, to the gardens of the Palais Royal, that they might shew the regent the misfortunes that he and Law had brought upon the country. Law’s coachman, who was sitting at the box of his master’s carriage, in the court-yard of the palace, happened to have more zeal than discretion, and, not liking that the mob should abuse his master, he said, loud enough to be overheard by several persons, that they were all blackguards, and deserved to be hanged. The mob immediately set upon him, and thinking that Law was in the carriage, broke it to pieces. The imprudent coachman narrowly escaped with his life. No further mischief was done; a body of troops making their appearance, the crowd quietly dispersed, after an assurance had been given by the regent that the three bodies they had brought to shew him should be decently buried at his own expense. The parliament was sitting at the time of this uproar, and the president took upon himself to go out and see what was the matter. On his return he informed the councillors that Law’s carriage had been broken by the mob. All the members rose simultaneously, and expressed their joy by a loud shout, while one man, more zealous in his hatred than the rest, exclaimed, “And Law himself, is he torn to pieces?13