Thursday, December 1, 2011

Pollock: So that's why you're calling Jon Corzine a chicken on CNN? Koutoulas: Yes, where's the money, Jon?

Today's Senate hearings into the MF Global debacle demonstrate that conflicted Chairman (and ex-Goldman Sachs CEO) Gary Gensler is unwilling to provide anything more than mere lip service to the beleagured customers whose funds remain inaccessible more than one month from the bankruptcy filing. Further, the issue of just why exactly SIPC, a securities resolution agency, is "managing" a futures commission merchant liquidation is among the more salient issues being completely ignored--except by various customer advocacy sites, such as MFGFacts and MyInvestorsPlace.

However, MF Global customers can take a bit of solace knowing they have a voice in front of Judge Glenn in the liquidation proceedings in the form of the Commodity Customer Coalition (#CCC) and its team of hard working attorneys (working largely pro bono, we might add). The synoganists remain Trustee James W. Giddens, earning $891 per hour and seemingly doing his best to drag out the proceedings, along with JP Morgan's attoneys, who are "dictating the agenda", according to CCC attorney James Koutoulas. [Update: for an expose of the conflicts of interest arising from Giddens' firm, Hughes Hubbard, vis a vis JP Morgan Chase, MF Global's largest creditor, see this excellent piece by MFGFacts.]

Is it too little too late? We hope not, as continuance after continuance increases the odds that looting of customer funds continues to this day. In a brief but compelling video (below), Warren E. Pollock of Inflection Points goes head to head with a few journalists outside the bankruptcy court in lower Manhattan, then conducts a candid, must-watch interview with Mr. Koutoulas.


A few choice excerpts:

at 3:30 in:

Koutoulas: We were the first group to object to JP Morgan's use of the cash collateral. I think over the weekend, three or four other parties have joined our objection. And they keep continuing it...I'm going to get up and say, "Judge, there are some issues we have to talk about. We can't just keep continuing this ad infinitum." One of those is--you probably saw on ZeroHedge--the way that Order is written, it makes it possible...if these [repo-to-maturity] trades are still on, we have to know about it.

Pollack: You don't know if the trades are on right now--normally they'd have to wind down positions. But they could still be tapping into customer money at this very moment and there's no way to...recognize that.

Koutoulas: And if they did do that...that is the ultimate epitome of enabling someone to fall in love with their trade....These trades bankrupted MF Global, and the fact that there's even a possibility that they could still be on and still be using customer money to back them, it's beyond the pale.

at 5:25 in:

Koutoulas: The problem here is JP Morgan's lawyers are running the show...and they're running the agenda...Judge, the fox is in the hen house. JP Morgan cannot be dictating the agenda.

at 5:50 in:

Pollack: So that's why you're calling Jon Corzine a chicken on CNN?

Koutoulas: Yes...stand up...where's the money, Jon?

The Outcome:

In the course of the hearing that followed, the Judge asked the CCC to file a motion to formally make its case against the JP Morgan super priority status and the continued trading of customer funds. A hearing was set for December 7, 2011. Let's hope there's still money left by then.

Friday, November 25, 2011

Are MF Global Customer Funds Being Looted to This Day Through the Same Risky Trading That Sunk the Firm?

As MF Global customers approach the one month anniversary of the cluster-circus that has become the liquidation proceedings, replete with unnecessary delays, half-measures, and outright deceptive statements by Trustee James W. Giddens (that will only ensure the proliferation of hours billable at $890 each), we wish to highlight an order entered just days after the bankruptcy that gave MF Global Holdings and its affiliates carte blanche to continue the very risky and suspicious trading that led to its demise. A hearing is set for Wednesday, November 30, 2011 at 3:00 pm on this and other germane matters, including the super priority status of JP Morgan Chase (the conflicted first-lien holder) afforded to it ahead of the customers whose segregated accounts were putatively to have been held sacrosanct.
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On November 2, 2011, the bankruptcy judge entered a seemingly innocuous order that granted an extension of time to the Debtors (MF Global Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Finance USA Inc.) to comply with the requirements of Section 345(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and an authorization of the continuation of intercompany transactions among the Debtors and non-Debtor affiliates. Detailed arguments were provided in the 19 page Motion of the Debtors filed the day of their October 31, 2011 bankruptcy.
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Of particular interest are the arguments for allowance of the continuation of extant investment practices. When reading the pleading, note that "Company" refers specifically to MF Global Inc., the broker dealer/futures commission merchant unit that did NOT file for bankruptcy, while "Debtors" refers to MF Global Holdings and MF Global Finance, which did file for bankruptcy. "Debtors" and "Company" are frequently mixed within paragraphs, which either causes confusion as to intent or allows for an expansive interpretation that justifies the continued looting of customer accounts. All emphasis herein is ours, except for headings:
D. The Debtors Should Be Authorized to Continue Their Investment Practices
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23...The Deposit and Investment Practices are governed by an investment policy, which provides that such investment activities must comply with federal and state regulations, as well as any regulations imposed by its regulators. In addition, the investment policy describes the Company’s permissible investments, which include: (a) government securities and government guaranteed securities; (b) money funds; (c) United States Treasury and government money funds; (d) federal agency obligations; (e) corporate obligations; (f) money market instruments; and (g) other permissible investments approved by the Company’s investment committee from time to time.
The blanket generalization in (g) opens the door to any of the investments that the Company, MF Global Inc., had engaged in previously, including the famed $6.3 billion in European debt [off balance sheet] repo-to-maturity trades. Ordinarily, any such investments not guaranteed directly or indirectly by the US government would be subject to a performance bond:
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24. Bankruptcy Code section 345(a) authorizes a debtor-in-possession to make deposits or investments of estate money in a manner “as will yield the maximum reasonable net return on such money, taking into account the safety of such deposit or investment.” 11 U.S.C. § 345(a). If a deposit or investment is not “insured or guaranteed by the United States or by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States or backed by the full faith and credit of the United States,” Bankruptcy Code section 345(b) provides that the debtor must require that the entity with which the deposit or investment is made obtain a bond in favor of the United States that is secured by the undertaking of an adequate corporate surety. Id. § 345(b).
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However, arguments would be made for an exemption:
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25. The Court has discretion to modify the section 345(b) requirements “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 345(b). Indeed, while these requirements may be “‘wise in the case of a smaller debtor with limited funds that cannot afford a risky investment to be lost, [they] can work to needlessly handcuff larger, more sophisticated debtors...
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Sophisticated, indeed. The pleading continues with a rather confusing paragraph that implies the exemption from a performance bond is required for investments that would be in bank accounts, the balances of which exceed FDIC insurance limits. Yet, the final sentence implies there is more going on than simple bank account sweeps when it mentions "[investments and deposits] made by non-Debtor affiliates engaging in the Company's core investments businesses." (Again, "Company" refers to the broker dealer/futures commission merchant unit, while "Debtors" refers to MF Global Holdings and MF Global Finance.)
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26. The Debtors submit that the circumstances of this case warrant such relief. The Company is a large, sophisticated entity with a complex Cash Management System that relies on multiple Banks and Bank Accounts on a daily basis. The Bank Accounts used by the Debtors are maintained in the United States and are with stable financial institutions that are insured by the FDIC. Furthermore, in light of the regular deposits and sweeps of the Bank Accounts, requiring the Debtors, or any entity with which money is deposited or invested by the Debtors in accordance with the Deposit and Investment Practices, to incur the expense of posting a bond to the extent that the balances of these accounts exceed FDIC insurance limits at a given time would be especially burdensome and wasteful. Finally, in addition to the Company’s own investment policies that serve as a safeguard of the Debtors’ funds, there is a significant distinction between the Debtors’ own investments and deposits—which support the Debtors’ cash-management function—and those made by non-Debtor affiliates engaging in the Company’s core investments businesses.
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27. Accordingly, the Court should authorize the Debtors to continue to deposit funds and invest in accordance with the Deposit and Investment Practices and grant the Debtors a 60-day extension, without prejudice to seek further extensions, to either comply with Bankruptcy Code section 345(b) or to make other arrangements that would be acceptable to the U.S. Trustee.
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The Debtors then argue, through a series of complex legal arguments, to be explicitly allowed to continue with intercompany transactions, the relevance of which will be explained following the excerpts.
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E. The Debtors Should Be Authorized to Continue Intercompany Transactions
28. The Debtors’ books and records also reflect numerous other intercompany
account balances among various Debtors as of the Petition Date. All prepetition intercompany
account balances have been frozen, as of the Petition Date, and the treatment of such claims will
be determined as part of an overall reorganization plan for the Debtors.
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29. To ensure that each individual Debtor will not, at the expense of its creditors, fund the operations of another Debtor entity, the Debtors respectfully request that, pursuant to section 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, all intercompany claims against a Debtor by another Debtor arising after the Petition Date as a result of intercompany transactions and allocations (“Postpetition Intercompany Claims”) be accorded superpriority status, with priority over any and all administrative expenses of the kind specified in sections 503(b) and 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, subject and subordinate only to (a) any order granting adequate protection to the prepetition secured lenders and (b) other valid liens...
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30. In addition, in connection with their role under the Cash Management System facilitating the operations of the non-Debtor affiliates, the Debtors may, in the ordinary course of business, periodically infuse capital into certain of their subsidiaries and affiliates, including non-Debtor non-U.S. affiliates. These infusions of capital generally are accomplished through the making of intercompany loans. The Debtors use repayments of such loans as a tax efficient method of managing cash throughout their worldwide business enterprise. Because the non-Debtor affiliates are part of the same group of affiliated entities as the Debtors, the entirety of intercompany transactions among Debtors and non-Debtor affiliates alike remain within the spectrum of the Debtors’ control.
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31. The relief requested herein is necessary because certain non-Debtor affiliates may require intercompany advances in order to maintain their liquidity and going concern value. Courts frequently have granted such superpriority status to postpetition intercompany claims in cases such as this. ...
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33. The Cash Management System allows the Debtors to track all obligations owing between related entities and thereby ensures that all setoffs of intercompany transactions will meet both the mutuality and timing requirements of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Debtors respectfully request that the Debtors and their non-Debtor affiliates be expressly authorized to set off prepetition obligations arising on account of intercompany transactions between a Debtor and another Debtor or between a Debtor and a non-Debtor affiliate. Further, the Intercompany Transactions provide numerous benefits to the Debtors. The Debtors therefore seek to continue the Intercompany Transactions postpetition in the ordinary course of their businesses.
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While it might be desirable under a "normal" financial company bankruptcy to seek maximization of benefits to the Debtors such that creditors be paid as much as possible during recovery, MF Global Inc customers (who are NOT creditors) can currently expect at best a 60% recovery going into mid-December and should be placed first in line until 100% recovery is obtained. Further, from the numerous conflations and generalizations in the paragraphs above that allow, for among other things, payments to non-US affiliates, it is possible that the looting of MF Global customer funds continues to this day. We wonder if this is why the MF Global trustee continually revises upwards the estimated maximum loss of customer funds.
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As to exactly how this might be possible, we pointed out as early as November 9 that the Euro debt repo-to-maturity trades were performed by MF Global Inc. with an affiliate (not Goldman or JP Morgan, as was hypothesized in the media), with the affiliate to receive 80% of profits from the transactions. Inasmuch as J. Christopher Flowers and friends were among MF Global Holdings' larges shareholders, it is conceivable that outflows continue to this day to an affiliate of Jon Corzine's good friend.
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Given the extension granted by the judge allows these potential shenanigans to continue throughout the end of 2012, it is imperative that immediate disclosure of all trading and intercompany transfers be obtained, especially if they are being conducted to the derogation of the customers.
* * *
MF Global Customer Resources:
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Commodity Customer Coalition (7,000 members and growing)
EBatEPJ (website, twitter feed, email: english (at) economicpolicyjournal (dot) com)
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* * *

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Futures Regulators Sanctioned, Then Delayed Rule Changes Regarding Ability of Firms, Such as MF Global, to Bet With Customer Funds

EconomicPolicyJournal.com has learned that in 2003, the National Futures Association (NFA), a futures industry self-regulatory organization, wrote a letter to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the industry's governmental regulator, successfully arguing for rule changes that would lift restrictions on trading with customer segregated funds by clearing firms, such as MF Global Inc.

Six years later, after substantial restrictions on trading with customer funds were proposed in 2010 pursuant to Dodd-Frank, MF Global lobbied the CFTC through public comment letters and private meetings. Ultimately, the CFTC would choose to delay implementation of the reforms only months before MF Global's demise and bankruptcy.

Sweeping regulatory changes in the futures industry were made in the year 2000, including to CFTC Rule 1.25, which governs the ability of firms to invest customer segregated funds. But, an obscure CFTC letter from 1984 limited the ability of clearing firms to loan customer funds and securities outright, through what are called repurchase (or repo) contracts, unless the clearing firm had explicit permission from the customer. In 2003, the CFTC proposed a revision to the rule to eliminate these and other restrictions.

In the NFA's 2003 comment letter to the CFTC, archived on its website, it said, "NFA supports the proposed amendment to CFTC Rule 1.25 allowing [futures clearing firms] to engage in repurchase agreements with collateral deposited by customers. The safeguards included in the proposal...provide ample protection for customer deposited securities. The amendment provides greater flexibility, requires less paperwork, and reduces the burden on [futures clearing firms] and their customers." The NFA also argued, "it is not necessary to provide an opt-out mechanism...[which would be] costly and burdensome...without a corresponding regulatory benefit."

MF Global filed for bankruptcy on October 31, 2011 after $6.3 billion in risky bets on European debt (so-called repo-to-maturity trades) were required by regulators to be made public, leading to ratings downgrades of the firm. Other investment firms and banks then requested more collateral as insurance for trades they had made with MF Global, which were unable to be met.

While it is alleged that the $6.3 billion in European debt repurchase trades were conducted with MF Global's own firm money, it is unknown how an estimated $600 million in customer segregated funds went missing. If MF Global had lent customer cash or securities through repurchase contracts, it is possible a counterparty to the trade kept the cash or securities as collateral for other trades with MF Global.

Pursuant to the the Dodd-Frank bill signed into law on July 21, 2010, the CFTC proposed reforms to Rule 1.25 that would have limited investment in customer funds. In a letter to the CFTC, MF Global's general counsel, Laurie Ferber, formerly managing director Goldman Sachs, objected to many of the proposed changes, including what were to be severe restrictions on repurchase transactions, including those with customer funds and with affiliates of the firm.

Ms. Ferber's influence in futures regulation is substantial and spans over two decades. As general counsel to a commodity firm owned by Goldman Sachs, in 1991, she was able to secure a secret letter from the CFTC (made public only in 2008) that granted exceptions to limitations designed to curb speculation in commodity futures.

On July 20, 2010, Ms. Ferber, along with MF Global president and former Goldman Sachs CEO, Jon Corzine, appeared in two private meetings with high level CFTC officials, including another former Goldman Sachs CEO, Gary Gensler, to discuss the proposed rule changes. The same day, the CFTC announced in the Federal Register (footnote 4) that the proposed changes to Rule 1.25 governing customer funds would not be addressed and "may be subject to future [CFTC] rulemaking."

It was only three months later that MF Global would admit to regulators that over $600 million in customer funds could not be accounted for. Over $800 million in cash remains frozen in customer accounts, including those of bona fide hedgers, such as farmers and bread producers.

Dither, MF Global Trustee Giddens

Yesterday, MF Global Inc. liquidation trustee James W. Giddens, filed an application to the bankruptcy court to establish claims procedures for MF Global brokerage customers who have had their cash frozen for over two weeks now, as well as the broker's general creditors. While this would seem a step in the right direction, the proposal falls far short of what could be done to provide relief for MF Global customers, while imposing further unnecessary delays. The proposal was filed with a motion for an expedited hearing on the matter to be conducted the very next day (today, in fact, at 3:30 pm), which was granted minutes later by the bankruptcy judge, according to the docket.
_
Per the proposal, claim forms would be mailed to MF Global customer on November 28 and be posted on the trustee's website, whereafter customers would have two months, extended up to six months in some cases, to file claims. Other documents filed suggest there would be a 60% payout, but the trustee's proposal does not outline any specific timeline or payout percentage. [Update: In a separate motion, the Trustee has requested expedited payment of 60% of customer funds.] Indeed, his proposal says interim distributions would be made "if possible". This is wholely unacceptable. Based on current estimated missing funds of $600 million, or approximately 12% of segregated account assets, the assumed 60% payout is well below any reasonable threshold, especially considering the CME Group has pledged $250 million to backstop any overpayment by the trustee.
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Trustee Giddens cited the "relatively poor state of the Debtor’s books and records", as we noted yesterday. However, as the below press release of the Commodity Customer Coalition points out, this is irrelevant to the delay of an immediate payout. Per futures industry regulations, each futures customer receives a daily statement of cash and open positions, marked to market. Such statements were produced even on October 31, 2011, the day of the MF Global bankruptcy filing. Many customers continued to receive electronic statements for days afterwards. Thus, what should be in the futures customers' accounts is known to the penny. What assets actually back those statements up is another matter. But, again, estimated losses support a much higher initial payout than 60%, especially with the CME's backstop.
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In the meantime, trustee Giddens will continue to charge $891 per hour against MF Global assets (in addition to research fees of 1% for misdirected wires), and SIPC, inexperienced with futures broker liquidations (and still managing the Lehman liquidation three years and counting), is all the customers have to represent their interests. It is critical that MF Global customers obtain proper representation on what might currently be a compromised creditor committee.
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Full press release of the Commodity Customer Coalition follows.

Commodity Customer Coalition
190 South La Salle Street, Suite 3000
Chicago, IL 60603
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
312-933-6564
November 16, 2011
CONTACT: John L. Roe (jroe@btrtrading.com)
Commodity Customer Coalition to Object to SIPC Trustee’s Claims Process for MF Global Bankruptcy, Propose Faster Alternative Claims Process
In response to the SIPC Trustee’s expedited application for an order from the court to put both securities and commodities customers of MF Global through the same claims process, the Commodity Customer Coalition (“CCC”) is filing an emergency objection to that application and proposing a faster, more efficient claims process to immediately release a majority of customer funds. The CCC issued the following statement:
The Commodity Customer Coalition applauds the Trustee’s recent motion to release 60% of assets held in cash on October 31, 2011. However, that simply isn’t good enough. This only represents a very small portion of the total assets frozen in the bankruptcy. Additionally, the Trustee has proposed a snail mail approach to collecting claims. He says they cannot use the books of MF Global to verify customer claims, but his process will only result in customers mailing him statements based on those books and it will do so over a period of months. Our proposal will streamline this process with a more commonsense approach, affirm the primacy of customer property over the claims of creditors and return funds to their rightful owners in a matter of days, not months.
The basis for the Trustee’s proposal is that he cannot give us an accurate accounting of the shortfall in customer funds. But MF Global’s estate has $1.2 billion in excess equity and the CME has thrown him a life line of $250 million if he sends home too much money. MF Global claimed under oath that only $600 million in funds is missing. So the shortfall in funds is irrelevant; the Trustee has 250% over the shortfall. That money is supposedly accounted for on a daily basis to the NFA, CFTC and MF’s DSRO, which was the CME. The Trustee has had over two weeks to sort through this and get clients their money. It’s time to truly expedite this process and make customers whole.
Mr. James Koutoulas, Esq. will appear in person tomorrow to argue the CCC motion before the court. He will make himself available to the press immediately following the hearing on the steps of the courthouse.
###
The Commodity Customer Coalition now represents over 7,000 former MF Global customers whose funds have been frozen by the SIPC Trustee. For more information, or to schedule interviews, please contact John L. Roe
(jroe@btrtrading.com, 312-933-6564).


Tuesday, November 15, 2011

The Commodity Customer Coalition Objects to JP Morgan's Super-Priority Protection Over MF Global Customers

Last week, we noted many peculiarities with respect to the MF Global bankruptcy, not the least of which is the first-lien protection granted to JP Morgan Chase only two days after the bankruptcy, which gives the bank (MF Global's largest creditor) priority claim over MF Global's own customers--an unprecedented act within the futures industry. To date, an estimated $600 million of what were supposed to be segregated customer funds remains missing, and the remaining cash in thousands of customer accounts, including that of farmers, producers and speculators alike, remains frozen.

Only yesterday, after collaboration with other customer attorneys, James Koutoulas filed an objection to JP Morgan's super-priority protection. Inquiries, including those of other MF Global customers and the media may made through the Commodity Customer Coalition website.

The text of the Objection follows. The full filing here:

Pg 1 of 12

James L. Koutoulas, Esq. 190

S. LaSalle St., #3000

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 836-1180

James L. Koutoulas

Counsel for the Commodity Customer Coalition

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:

MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS LTD, et al.

Debtors

Chapter 11

Case No. 11-15059 (MG)

COMMODITY CUSTOMER COALITION’S OBJECTION TO THE

MOTION OF THE DEBTORS FOR INTERIM AND FINAL ORDERS UNDER

11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363(c), AND 363(e) AND BANKRUPTCY RULES 2002, 4001,

6003, 6004 AND 9014 (I) AUTHORIZING THE DEBTORS TO USE CASH

COLLATERAL, (II) GRANTING ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE

LIQUIDITY FACILITY LENDERS, AND (III) SCHEDULING A FINAL

HEARING PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULES 4001(b) AND (c)

The Commodity Customer Coalition, which is made up of numerous MF Global, Inc. customers such as Phil Edgerley, a hog farmer from central Illinois, as well as those other customers listed on Exhibit A (and, on an informal basis, represents the interests of over 2,500 MF Global, Inc. customers who have indicated interest via email or through their brokers) (together, the “Customers”), objects to the Motion of the Debtors for Interim and Final Orders (“Motion”) on the following grounds:[1] (i) the Debtors have not provided adequate notice of the

1 Capitalized terms that are otherwise not defined in this Objection shall have the same meaning ascribed to them in Debtors’ Motion.

Pg 2 of 12

Motion to all interested parties; (ii) no one — not the Liquidity Facility Lenders or the professionals — is entitled to priority secured interests in assets that may belong to Customers; (iii) the Debtors have not proposed any protection for the priority interests of Customers; and (iv) the Liquidity Facility Lenders are not entitled to a finding of good faith at this stage in the proceedings.

INTRODUCTION

MF Global, Inc. was a registered broker-dealer, used by its Customers to trade commodities, futures and derivatives. Customers maintained accounts at MF Global, Inc., which were supposed to be held inviolate under CFTC Regulation 4.20(c), and which have a first-priority right of recovery under 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) and 17 C.F.R. § 190.08. Yet, it appears that over $600 million in Customer funds are unaccounted for at MF Global, Inc. (“Missing Funds”), due to poor internal controls, and may have been commingled with proprietary funds held by MF Global, Inc., and the Debtors.

Presently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the FBI, and the Trustee overseeing the liquidation of MF Global, Inc., are investigating the disposition of the Missing Funds. It could be that some or all of the missing funds are held by, or are tied up in assets owned by, the Debtors. According to Section 766(h) of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, such funds would have to be returned to the Customers before any other creditor.

Pg 3 of 12

In the meantime, Debtors, the Liquidity Facility Lenders, and the professionals representing both, have sought approval to carve out funds for themselves — under a so-called super-priority protection — without regard to the Customers’ right to have their funds returned before any other money is spent from the bankruptcy estate. Yet, the Debtors have not provided notice to all MF Global, Inc. customers, nor have they apparently even notified the trustee for MF Global, Inc. of the potential impact of the Motion on potential Customer funds.

Indeed, if granted, such a super-priority right would abrogate sacrosanct protections for commodities account holders, depriving those who trade in commodities, futures, and derivatives, of their only protection and potentially chill economic activity. It is premature to enter such an order — particularly one that includes a “good faith” finding to a lender that may have benefitted from the improper transfer of the Customer Funds to pay down an outstanding loan.

BACKGROUND

MF Global customers represent a cross-section of people across America and the world, from farmers and ranchers who hedge their crops and herds, to oil producers and miners who use futures to lock-in prices and take delivery of physical commodities, to retirees who invest in futures to diversify their portfolios. For example, farmers who have crops in the field need to sell futures in commodity markets so they can lock in prices for their future yields today, instead of taking on market risk as they would otherwise be exposed to volatile price swings. Large corporations like Coca-Cola who make money in foreign markets do not want to lose

Pg 4 of 12

money when they repatriate revenue earned in foreign currency. They have to be able to forecast future expenses and profits accurately in the currency of their domicile and hedge that currency price risk in futures markets accordingly.

Investors add volume and liquidity to these markets which allow for better, more efficient pricing of commodities. This allows for stability in prices of commodities and predictability of future profit and loss, which in turn allows for stability in producer and consumer prices. These commodities include everything from grains like corn and wheat, to energy like oil and natural gas, to soft goods like cotton and sugar, to currencies like the US dollar and Euro, to financial instruments like bonds and stock indexes. Simply put, trading in commodity futures markets is a mainstay of the American economic engine.

Segregated Funds: Cornerstone of the Commodities Industry:

One of the big differences between commodities brokers and securities (stocks and bonds) brokers is that commodity brokers have an obligation to keep customer funds completely segregated from the firm’s own assets. This is to ensure that clients are completely protected from losses sustained by the firms’ trading and operations. It also is in contrast to the securities industry, as the Securities Investors Protection Act back-stops losses suffered by securities investors due to broker malfeasance, but does not similarly back-stop similar losses suffered by commodities investors.

Many industry groups and regulators have heralded segregated account protection, arguing that no client has ever lost a penny from a segregated account as the result of a broker bankruptcy, and this has been a key driver of volume and profitability for the Chicago

Pg 5 of 12

Mercantile Exchange. “However, all futures trading accounts, including managed futures, have the advantage of specific industry rules that require the segregation of customer funds from the firm's own funds. The practice of segregating customer funds protects investors in the event of default at the Futures Clearing Merchant (FCM, the industry term for futures brokerage firms licensed to trade on futures exchanges in the U.S.) holding their account. While FCM bankruptcies are rare, they do occur. In 2005, Refco Inc. and 23 of its unregulated subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. However, Refco's regulated subsidiaries (where customers' futures trading and managed futures accounts resided) were unaffected and customers were able to continue trading and managing their accounts.” See “Safeguarding Customers Through Segregated Funds” by CME Group, Inc. http://www.cmegroup.com/managedfutures/Feb2011/safeguarding-customers-through-segregated-funds.html.

So, whereas securities clients are afforded various insurance in the event of a broker bankruptcy, commodities clients are afforded none—which is economically rational only because their funds cannot be commingled with a broker's assets and cannot be used to pay creditors in a bankruptcy. Segregated funds are accounted for daily to the National Futures Association (“NFA”) and to the CFTC through the broker’s designated self-regulatory organization (“DSRO”), which in MF Global’s case was the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”).

MF Global Did Not Maintain Segregated Accounts

Despite the fact that MF Global was responsible for maintaining full segregation of customer funds on a daily basis, there remains $633M in unaccounted for customer segregated

Pg 6 of 12

funds two weeks after the firm filed bankruptcy. Moreover, the officers and directors of MF Global have thus far been uncooperative in aiding the court in ascertaining the whereabouts of these missing funds, despite a formal probe by the CFTC, the US futures regulator. This has driven the Trustee’s office to comment: “Our forensic investigators have been there since last week and nothing we have found so far causes us to think anything other than there is an apparent shortfall at MF.” See “MF Global Fund Frustration Grows, CFTC Confirms Probe,” by Reuters, November 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-mfglobal-cftc-investigation-idUSTRE7A96C420111111

These failures to cooperate are consistent with the operating history of MF Global, which is fraught with examples of misconduct and disregard for regulations. “An analysis of regulatory enforcement actions shows MF Global has drawn more sanctions from the U.S. commodity futures regulator than each of its 14 closest peers in that market over the past decade. MF Global has also drawn the second highest amount in fines, for alleged lapses in risk supervision and recordkeeping.” See “Insight: Risk, Lax Oversight Riddle MF Global’s Past,” by Reuters, November 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-mfglobal-legal-fidUSTRE7AA2KO20111111

As of today, it is not clear where the Missing Funds might be—although they may have been taken as part of one or more margin calls related to sovereign debt held by MF Global on its own account. See “MF Global May Have Used Customer Funds In The Losing $6.3 Billion Trade Without Informing Clients,” November 8, 2011, Forbes, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2011/11/08/mf-global-used-customer-funds-in-the-

Pg 7 of 12

losing-6-3-billion-trade-without-informing-clients/. The CME has gone so far as to say that it appears MF Global moved funds immediately prior to bankruptcy from “segregated funds in a manner that may have been designed to avoid detection,” according to a CME statement on November 2, 2011. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cme-group-statement-regardingmf-global-133102203.html. It is equally possible that these funds were seized and used to pay down the line of credit held by MF Global Holdings, Ltd. or have otherwise been used to bolster cash held by the Debtors.

ARGUMENT

Due to the apparent shortfall of customer segregated funds and the lack of cooperation by MF Global officers and directors in determining its whereabouts, it is imperative that the Court does not grant any liens, encumbrances, priorities, or super-priorities of any assets in the Debtors without protection for customer funds at this time.2 To do so could allow Debtors and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”) to obtain a priority over Customers on Customer Funds, in derogation of the Bankruptcy Code and CFTC regulations. This would deprive commodity investors of the one protection they have — a right to priority payout — and possibly further chill economic activity in these troubled economic times. Accordingly, absent some protection for Customers, Debtors’ Motion must be denied.

2 Objectors realize that MF Global Holdings, Ltd. and the other Debtors wish to reorganize and that many thousands of jobs are at stake. Given the $1.2 billion in equity claimed by the Debtors in their Voluntary Petition, there should be a way to provide adequate protection without impacting the rights of segregated customer account holders. Also, if in fact $1.2 billion in equity exists, one would think that existing equity holders would provide protection to the proposed lender to protect their interests.

Pg 8 of 12

I. Customers Have Absolute Priority Over Funds Implicated By The Motion.

According to 11 U.S.C. § 766(h), a bankruptcy trustee “shall distribute customer property ratably to customers on the basis and to the extent of such customers’ allowed net equity claims, and in priority to all other claims, except [limited costs] attributable to the administration of customer property.” (emphasis added.) Under 17 C.F.R. 190.8, “customer property” includes (among other things) cash, securities or other property “received, acquired or held to margin, guarantee, secure, purchase or sell a commodity contract,” any “open commodity contracts,” and even cash, securities or property that “[w]as unlawfully converted but is part of the debtor’s estate.” The Motion implicates customer property in at least two ways.

First, it is unquestionable that there are well over $600 million in Customer funds that simply have not been accounted for. If speculation is true, the Missing Funds could have been seized in a margin call or otherwise improperly applied by the Debtors to their outstanding obligations. Commingling between MF Global, Inc. and Debtors could necessitate a finding of substantive consolidation. Such a finding would, in turn, merit treating Debtors like futures clearing merchants. Such a finding would obviate the protection of Chapter 11, necessitate Debtors’ immediate liquidation, and would unquestionably require priority return of assets to Customers. Until such time as the SEC, CFTC, FBI, and the trustee overseeing the MF Global, Inc. liquidation have completed their forensic analysis, the Court ought to treat the funds that the Debtors seek to use as if they include the Missing Funds.

Second, the Motion and Amended Interim Order each provide that JPMorgan can obtain a super-priority or first priority lien (JP Morgan currently is an unsecured creditor) on all

Pg 9 of 12

property in which Debtors have an interest, including “intercompany indebtedness ... owed by MF Global, Inc. to each Debtor.” In other words, it is possible, under the Motion, for JPMorgan to obtain a seemingly preferred interest in payments that MF Global, Inc. owes to Debtors—and could use that priority to force MF Global, Inc. to pay JPMorgan rather than pay Customers. The Proposed Order, in Paragraph 5, also gives JPMorgan priority over any claims.

Put simply, given the unknowns at this stage in the proceeding, it is undeniable that the Motion may impact funds and/or assets that should first be paid out to Customers—not to lenders and professionals.

II. Customers Should Have Received Notice.

In this matter, notice has been given in haphazard fashion. Debtors sought and received interim rights over cash collateral and JPMorgan received its super-priority rights on an interim basis without any real notice being given. Then, a hearing was noticed for November 14, 2011. An amended notice, found at Dkt. No. 63, re-set the hearing for Thursday, November 16, 2011, at 3:30 p.m. It also set the objection date for November 11, 2011. Of course, the 16th is a Wednesday and November 11, 2011, was a federal holiday.

Even assuming Debtors have calendar-challenges rather than devious intent, Customers still should have received notice of the Motion. As first-priority claimants for whom over $600 million in collateral has vanished, it seems unquestionable that Customers of MF Global, Inc. potentially have rights that ought to be protected in the closely related bankruptcy of MF Global Holdings, Ltd. Yet, no effort was made even to post notice of the Motion on the SIPC trustee’s website in the related bankruptcy.

Pg 10 of 12

http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/Project/default.aspx. For this reason alone, the Motion ought to be denied at this time, until adequate (and accurate) notice can be provided to Customers.

III. The Court Ought To Protect Customer Funds.

As noted above, a finding of commingling between MF Global, Inc. and Debtors could necessitate a finding that MF Global, Inc. and the Debtors were substantively consolidated. Such a finding would, in turn, merit treating Debtors like futures clearing merchants. And, such a finding would require that the Court give first priority not to JPMorgan or the professionals in this matter, but to Customers.

It is not beyond the pale to expect that the massive investigation being undertaken by the SEC, CFTC, FBI, and SIPC trustee, will unearth facts that support such a finding. Accordingly, assuming the Court finds that Debtors provided adequate notice, the Court should protect the Customers’ funds. One such protection would be to release $633 million immediately from the estate of MF Global Holdings, Ltd., which reports excess equity of more than $1.3 Billion. (See Mot. at 5.) This would leave Debtors and their lenders with sufficient additional equity to wind-down Debtors’ business.

Absent such relief, Customers have no other recourse. Indeed, the SIPC cannot provide relief to the Customers, as its protections only inure to those trading in securities. The CME’s offer of $250,000,000 in liquidity does not staunch the bleeding, either. It is an insufficient band-aid, at best. As a result, hundreds, if not thousands, of commodity traders are being forced to liquidate trading positions, are losing opportunities to trade and to hedge market risk, and are losing trading positions because the cash they need in order to make margin calls is

Pg 11 of 12

tied up with MF Global. These parties’ inability to trade, combined with the commodity market’s loss of confidence resulting from this collapse, will certainly have a chilling effect on the economy.

Accordingly, the Customers ask that the Court protect Customer funds by immediately releasing $633 million to them or, in the alternative, clearly providing — in any final order relating to the Motion—that: (i) Customers shall have a right to an ad hoc committee to monitor events in these bankruptcy proceedings; and (ii) any priority lien given to any party in this bankruptcy shall not be superior to the rights, if any, of the Customers to recover from this bankruptcy estate; and (iii) professionals have no right to recover for fees and expenses until such time as any funds deemed — by the SEC, CFTC, FBI, the SIPC trustee, or this Court — to be Customer funds have been released to the Customers.

IV. It Is Too Soon To Make A Good Faith Finding.

In the Interim Order, it specifically provides that JPMorgan is deemed to have acted in “good faith” and, accordingly, is entitled to the protection of Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(m) and 264(e). Simply put, until the SEC, CFTC and SIPC trustee have completed their investigations, it is simply too soon to determine whether JPMorgan bargained in good faith, at arms-length, for the right to super-priority liens in this matter. Accordingly, Customers respectfully request that the Court note, in any final order relating to the Motion, that it is withholding judgment as to whether JPMorgan has acted in good faith in these proceedings.

Pg 12 of 12

V. Conclusion.

Were this Court to allow any party to have an interest superior to customer segregated funds, it would provide a loophole in the protections which are the bedrock of commodity trading. This Court should only provide for the use of Cash Collateral which protects customer funds as Congress, the CFTC, CME, and hundreds of thousands of commodity traders have, for over 100 years, believed to have been the case. The system of regulation in the commodities industry is based on this bedrock principle, and this proceeding should in no way affect it. Wherefore, Phil Edgerley, et al request this honorable Court to deny the request in its current form to utilize Cash Collateral, and only allow such use in a manner which protects segregated customer account holders.

Dated: November 14, 2011

By: /s/ James L. Koutoulas

James L. Koutoulas, Esq.

Pro Hac Vice Pending

On Behalf of Commodity Customer Coalition

and Plaintiffs Listed in Exhibit A

190 S. LaSalle St., #3000

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 836-1180

Disclosure: Neither the author of this post nor his affiliates is represented by Mr. Koutoulas, nor are they members of the Commodity Customer Coalition.

Friday, November 11, 2011

Who is Laurie Ruth Ferber of MF Global?

Laurie Ferber is MF Global's general counsel, and was previously a managing director of Goldman Sachs and general counsel of Drexel Burnham Lambert. More recently, she co-authored the December 2, 2011 letter to the CFTC arguing against many of the contemplated changes to CFTC Rule 1.25, which governs the investment of customer segregated funds. Yes, the same funds that have gone missing to the tune of over $500 million, which has given the excuse for Trustee Giddens,
working
billing at $891 per hour, to freeze ALL customer cash..billions of dollars spread over 50,000 active accounts. We highlighted this letter in our previous expose of MF Global's shady dealings here.

She also attended this meeting:


And this one:


"Alternatives to Credit Ratings" is the Rulemaking subsection that regarded reforms to Rule 1.25, investments of customer funds.

[Update] She also wrote this email to regulators on October 31, 2011, the day MF Global filed for bankruptcy, to advise of "a significant shortfall in segregated funds account".


Her full work bio is here:
Ms. Laurie R. Ferber serves as the General Counsel of MF Global Holdings Ltd. Ms. Ferber is responsible for legal and compliance functions, has operational and administrative responsibility for internal audit function, and is also responsible for regulatory relationships. She joined MF Global in 2009 and plays a key role in developing and implementing MF Global's corporate strategy. She is also responsible for managing litigation, compliance and regulatory matters of MF Global. Ms. Ferber served as Chief Regulatory Officer and General Counsel of International Derivatives Clearing Group, LLC since February 2009 and was responsible for all its legal and regulatory affairs, including compliance and a variety of corporate governance issues. She served as a Managing Director at Goldman, Sachs & Co. Prior to International Derivatives Clearing Group, from 1987 to 2008, she served in a number of capacities at Goldman Sachs & Co., including as General Counsel of J. Aron & Company and Co-General Counsel of the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities Division. Ms. Ferber also headed Goldman Sachs Derivatives Legal Group, and spent much of the last 9 years developing new businesses, including Economic Derivatives. She served as Chief of Staff of the Global Business Selection and Conflicts Group at Goldman and worked on its transition to a Bank Holding Company. Earlier in her career, she was an Attorney with the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and thereafter with Schulte, Roth & Zabel. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Ms. Ferber was general counsel of Drexel Burnham Lambert Trading Corp. and also traded energy products. She began her legal career in 1980 as an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and then at Schulte, Roth & Zabel. She is a Trustee of the Institute of Financial Markets and of New York University School of Law. She serves as a Director of the Futures Industry Association and on the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Financial Markets, and is a Member of the Lincoln Center Business Council. Ms. Ferber holds B.S. from State University of New York at Buffalo and earned her J.D. from New York University School of Law.
Ferber was likely placed at MF Global in 2009 by J. Christopher Flowers, one of Global's largest shareholders and also a Goldman alum. This would have paved the way for ex-Goldman Sachs CEO Jon Corzine to take the helm in February 2010.

Update: It seems Ms. Ferber almost single-handedly made commodities an asset class when she obtained this secret exemption letter from the CFTC, which did not surface until 2008. The letter was written to her by Jean Webb, CFTC Secretary, when Ms. Ferber was General Counsel of J. Aaron & Company, owned by Goldman Sachs. It granted an exemption to speculative position limits in commodities based on the hedging activities related to the Goldman Sachs Commodities Index. Matt Taibbi wrote about this here, but got his facts wrong, confusing the recipient (Ferber) with the sender (Webb).

Below is an excerpt from a post we wrote last year about how the GSCI was unexpectedly rebalanced in the summer of 2006 right as Paulson came into the Bush administration. It was the energy component that was substantially revised downward, which led to immediate forced selling and lower gas prices into the election. From this filing, we know Ferber sat on the GSCI Policy Committee at the time. She would have been the energy expert.

Ms. Ferber is also currently on the board of the Futures Industry Association, which wrote this letter in 2003 to support new rules that would allow repos with customer funds without notification or opt-out. We have not been able to establish if Ms. Ferber was on the board in 2003.


A prime example is the rebalancing of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) that took place in the summer of 2006. At the time, about $60 billion tracked the index, including some large pension funds, which would allocate a portion of their assets to purchasing commodity futures contracts in the exact weightings prescribed by the index. A change in the index composition would trigger buying or selling in the days and weeks that followed. There are several such commodity indexes, and they are periodically rebalanced pursuant to announced schedules, usually annually. However, according to the New York Times, on August 9, 2006, Goldman announced it would not roll over certain gasoline futures contracts into newly reformulated contracts. The result:
Unleaded gasoline made up 8.72 percent of Goldman’s commodity index as of June 30, but it is just 2.3 percent now, representing a sell-off of more than $6 billion in futures contract weighting.
...
Wholesale prices for New York Harbor unleaded gasoline, the major gasoline contract traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange, dropped 18 cents a gallon on Aug. 10, to $1.9889 a gallon, a decline of more than 8 percent, and they have dropped further since then.
Rob Kirby quoted Bill King, who had taken notice at the time:
Goldman's changes probably induced arbs, commercial hedgers, and other traders to sell September and October unleaded gasoline future contracts to avoid possible (settlement, delivery, etc.) problems.
September futures expired in August; October contracts expire September 29. So unleaded gasoline prices collapsed in August and September.
For the conspiracy minded, note that ex-Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson was sworn in as Treasury Secretary just a month prior in July, 2006, and that rising gas prices were becoming an issue for the approaching mid-term elections. The fall in the energy complex not only led to relief at the pump, but a pretty drastic (but short-lived) selloff in commodities overall.


Thursday, November 10, 2011

Bernanke Confirms Fed Might Raise Inflation Target [to Justify More Printing]

File under: expect the money printing to continue. Bernanke is giving the Fed an excuse to continue with its monetary expansionist profligacy against the backdrop of rising prices, which is smacking the Fed in the face. During the Bernanke press conference after the November 3, 2011 FOMC meeting, we Tweeted:
@zerohedge Did Ben just suggest the Fed is considering raising its inflation target?
This was in response to a curious phrasing by the Chairman. From the transcript:
ROBIN HARDING. Robin Harding from the Financial Times. Mr. Chairman, could you explain the menu of options that the Committee has for improving its communication about when it might raise interest rates and what the conditions are in which it might do that? For example, might it makes sense for the Fed to publish a forecast of its own future interest rates, and what’s the advantages and disadvantages of that? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BERNANKE. Well, again, as I noted in my opening remarks, no decisions have been made, so I want to be very clear that no final—you know, there is no final outcome here in this discussion. But clearly, there’s a range of things that we can do. We can provide more information about our objectives, for example. We could provide information about where we want inflation to be in the long term, for example. We can also provide information about the future path of interest rates, which we’ve done to some extent via our “mid-2013” language in the statement. An alternative approach, which Charlie Evans and others have suggested, is to tie that to economic conditions and to provide more information about under what circumstances we would raise rates. That is certainly something that we have discussed and I think is an interesting alternative. There’s a lot of interest in using the survey of economic projections in constructive ways as we have up until now to provide information to the public about our plans. And in particular, using the SEP as a way of giving information about our future policy decisions is something that’s on the table. There’s no decision made about that, but that’s one direction that we might find productive.
Today, at a town hall meeting with soldiers and their families, Bernanke again said:
We pursue those two important goals by influencing the level of interest rates and other financial conditions. My colleagues and I on the Federal Reserve's monetary policymaking committee equate price stability with inflation being at 2 percent or a little less. That rate is low enough that people and businesses can make financial decisions without having to worry too much about rising costs, but high enough to keep the economy away from deflation--falling wages and prices--which is both a cause and a symptom of an extremely weak economy. Although spikes in oil and food prices, and other transitory factors, pushed inflation up earlier this year, inflation appears to be moderating, and we expect, based on the best information that we have today, that it will remain reasonably close to our objective of 2 percent or a bit less for the foreseeable future.

In the longer term, monetary policy is the main determinant of inflation, and so Federal Reserve policymakers have considerable latitude to choose our longer-term inflation goal. In contrast, "maximum employment" depends on many factors outside of the Federal Reserve's control, such as the skills of the workforce and the pace of technological innovation. Right now, my colleagues on the Fed's policymaking committee estimate that the U.S. economy could sustain an unemployment rate of somewhere between 5 and 6 percent without generating a buildup of inflation pressures. But, regardless of whether the sustainable rate is 5 or 6 percent, with unemployment currently at 9 percent, our economy is certainly falling far short of maximum employment. That high unemployment rate is why the Federal Reserve is focusing its monetary policy at strengthening the recovery and job creation, including keeping short-term interest rates near zero and longer-term rates, such as mortgage rates, at the lowest levels in decades. Keeping borrowing costs very low supports consumer purchases of houses, cars, and other goods and services, as well as business investment in new equipment, software, and facilities. Over time, greater demand on the part of households and businesses leads to increased economic activity and employment.
Yes, in the topsy turvy world of Keynesian economics, 9% unemployment must be remedied by more money printing to make consumer products more expensive. Unfortunately, wages of the poorest are always the last to rise, since inflation is actually a subsidy to those who get the money first.

Full Text of National Futures Association Letter Approving of FCM Repos with Customer Funds Without Their Consent or Opt-out

Presented without comment (emphasis ours):
September 05, 2003

Via E-Mail (secretary@cftc.gov)

Ms. Jean A. Webb
Secretary
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20581

Re: Investment of Customer Funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 125 (June 30, 2003)

Dear Ms. Webb:

NFA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Commission's proposed amendment on the investment of customer funds. The proposal will give FCMs and DCOs greater flexibility in handling customer funds while ensuring that those funds are handled in a safe and efficient manner. Therefore, we support the proposal.

NFA supports the proposed amendment to CFTC Rule 1.25 allowing FCMs to engage in repurchase agreements with collateral deposited by customers. The safeguards included in the proposal, such as the marketability requirements, exclusion for specifically identifiable property, and required compliance with Rule 1.25(d), provide ample protection for customer deposited securities. The amendment provides greater flexibility, requires less paperwork, and reduces the burden on FCMs and their customers.

Since the amendment excludes specifically identifiable property, it is not necessary to provide an opt-out mechanism where a customer could instruct an FCM not to subject collateral/securities to a repurchase agreement. Furthermore, NFA believes that an opt-out provision would be costly and burdensome by requiring revisions to existing customer account agreements without a corresponding regulatory benefit.

The exclusion of specifically identifiable property also eliminates the need to require the FCM to replace the securities in the event of a default. Although replacing the securities may be the preferable course of action, NFA believes that it is acceptable, in the rare event of a default by a counterparty to a repurchase agreement [what about bankruptcy of FCM itself?], for the FCM to make the customer whole by giving the customer the cash equivalent of the securities plus any transaction costs that might be incurred in replacing them.

Additionally, NFA would support an amendment eliminating the dollar weighted average of the time-to-maturity limitation imposed on FCMs that invest solely in U.S. Treasury instruments. As mentioned by the Commission, Treasury instruments do not pose the same level of risk as other permitted investments. These instruments should, however, be subject to appropriate haircuts.

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at 312-781-1413 or tsexton@nfa.futures.org.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas W. Sexton
Vice President and General Counsel

Thomas W. Sexton, III remains Vice President and General Counsel to the NFA to this day.

Did the New York Federal Reserve Tank MF Global?

From FRBNY's website (emphasis ours):
*This week's purchase table includes $950 million of purchases that were made to replace transactions cancelled with MF Global Inc. (MF Global). MF Global, which had been a primary dealer, recently came under stress and ultimately a trustee was appointed pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act to liquidate the business. During this time, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the Bank) took progressive and proportionate steps to manage its exposure to the firm and ensure the ongoing effective implementation of monetary policy through open market operations.

The Bank ceased doing new business with MF Global and required the firm to post margin in respect of its $950 million outstanding agency MBS forward transactions with the Bank. The margin protected the Bank against potential exposure to MF Global due to fluctuations in the market value of the positions. When the firm was unable to meet a subsequent margin call on these transactions, the Bank declared an event of default, cancelled the transactions with MF Global and entered replacement transactions with other firms.

Replacement transactions were conducted in 30-year agency MBS and included purchases of: $300 million FNMA 3.5% coupons for December settlement, $100 million FNMA 4% coupons for November settlement, $200 million FNMA 4% coupons for December settlement, $250 million FHLMC 3.5% coupons for December settlement and $100 million FHLMC 3.5% coupons for January settlement.

The cost of replacing the cancelled transactions with MF Global was $3,089,843.75, which is based on the net difference between the price of the original trades and the price of the replacement transactions. The margin posted by MF Global was sufficient to cover the replacement cost.

When the trustee was appointed to liquidate the business, the Bank terminated MF Global's status as a primary dealer.

These measures were taken to protect the public interest and minimize risk to taxpayers, and under the framework of the primary dealer policy. The Federal Reserve did not suffer any loss as a result of the firm's failure.
So did the Fed return the difference between the $950 million margin posted and the replacement transactions costs, which would be about $946,910,156.25?