Friday, April 27, 2012
MF Global: And No One Stood Up
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
NY Fed's Brian Sack: Paint The Tape, Close Green, And Get Away Clean
Just why is he throwing in the towel now, scheduled to leave on the last transaction date of Operation Twist at the end of June, 2012? Is he conceding that, in fact, the Fed will never be able to extract itself from balance sheet hyperplasia? We cannot know for sure, but we can offer the following tribute to perhaps the second most influential person in the maddest of monetary experiments in Western central bank history.
Given that Sack started his current job after much of this buying by the Fed had already taken place, his biggest task over the coming few years will be to figure out how to best manage or even sell off big chunks of this $2 trillion portfolio of Fed assets without disrupting economic growth. As the Fed never really wanted all this stuff–buying it, essentially, to kick-start the economy–selling it all off may prove more complicated.
Because the MBS purchases were arranged with primary dealer counterparties directly, there was no auction mechanism to provide a measure of market supply. Instead, the pace of purchases of each class of MBS was adjusted in response to measures of whether that class appeared relatively cheap or expensive. To avoid buying at excessively high prices and to support market functioning, purchases were increased when market liquidity was good and were reduced when liquidity was poor.
To be sure, I think it is fair to say that [Fed balance sheet manipulation] is an imperfect policy tool. Even under the estimates noted earlier, the Federal Reserve had to increase its securities holdings considerably to induce the estimated 50 basis point response of longer-term rates. In addition, there is a large degree of uncertainty surrounding the estimates of these effects, given our limited experience with this instrument. Lastly, it is reasonable to assume that the effects of balance sheet expansion would diminish at some point, especially if yields were to move to extremely low levels. Nevertheless, the tool appears to be working, and it is not clear that we have yet reached a point of diminishing effects.
The risks to the [Fed] portfolio arise because the characteristics of the assets that have been purchased differ from those of the liabilities that have been created by those purchases. The assets held in the SOMA portfolio have fixed coupon rates that reflect longer-term interest rates. However, the purchases of those assets create reserves in the banking system, and the Federal Reserve pays interest on those reserves at a short-term interest rate that it controls. The interest paid on reserves can be thought of as the "funding cost" of the portfolio.Today, because short-term interest rates are low relative to longer-term interest rates, this mismatch produces a very elevated stream of net income. In particular, the SOMA portfolio has a weighted average coupon yield of about 3.5 percent, which, if applied to a $2.6 trillion portfolio, produces about $90 billion of income at an annualized rate.14 In contrast, the annualized funding cost of the portfolio at this time is only around $4 billion. This cost is relatively low because of the near-zero level of the interest rate paid on reserves. In addition, the private sector holds nearly $1 trillion of currency, which are liabilities of the Federal Reserve that bear no interest.15 Thus, the SOMA portfolio should produce a considerable amount of net income over the near term.16Beyond the near term, though, the income that will be produced by the SOMA portfolio is uncertain. If short-term interest rates were to rise, the funding cost of the portfolio would increase relative to the fairly steady yield earned on the assets held, reducing the amount of net income from the portfolio. In addition, if longer-term yields were to shift higher, the Federal Reserve could realize capital losses if it were to begin selling assets.However, even if interest rates did move up abruptly and the SOMA portfolio experienced realized losses, it would have no meaningful operational consequences for the Federal Reserve's ability to implement monetary policy. These losses would not impair the FOMC's ability to control short-term interest rates by paying interest on reserves or by draining reserves as needed. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve would continue to operate in the same manner that it otherwise would have in pursuing its economic mandate.What would be affected by unexpectedly large realized losses on the SOMA portfolio would be our remittances to the Treasury. All Federal Reserve earnings in excess of those needed to cover operating costs, pay dividends and maintain necessary capital levels are remitted to the U.S. Treasury on a weekly basis. Accordingly, any change to the income on the SOMA portfolio directly affects the amount of funds that the Federal Reserve remits to the Treasury. The unusually large amount of portfolio income realized of late has boosted those remittances considerably. If portfolio income were to decline going forward, whether toward more normal levels or toward unusually low levels, the amount of those remittances would adjust lower.17
17 In the most extreme case, the Federal Reserve would have to cease remittances to the Treasury for a time. Of course, one might also want to take into consideration the additional tax revenue to the government that could be generated by the more robust economic recovery supported by the asset purchase programs.
After the Fed massively expanded its balance sheet through the creation of reserves (printing digital money), it has attempted to mitigate price inflation by encouraging banks to keep such reserves parked at the Fed. This program, accelerated by you, Congress, in October, 2008, approved the payment of interest on reserves. As long as short term rates are exceptionally low (and Mr. Bernanke said they would be through mid-[2014]), this is a minor expense. Meanwhile, the Fed is earning higher interest rates on the $2 trillion+ in securities it bought as part of its so-called QE programs. It is the spread between what it earns and what it must pay that allows the Fed to remit funds to the Treasury, and by extension the taxpayers.When (and not if) short term interest rates rise (and the markets might force this in a violent fashion long before Mr. Bernanke would prefer), the Fed could easily go cash flow (or carry) negative. That is when the cost of paying banks interest on reserves (to reign in price inflation) exceeds the Fed's interest income it receives on the securities it holds. Consider that just under three decades ago, short term rates quickly reached nearly 20%.In response, the Fed could outright sell assets that it holds, but I urge you to consider what happens when the world's largest holder of Treasury securities switches from being a net buyer to a net seller of Treasurys and what it would do to the United States' long term borrowing rates. Mr. Bernanke [and (by extension) Mr. Sack believe] that [they] can blissfully guide the Fed to a graceful exit from its $2 trillion+ balance sheet expansion. You might not wish to give [them] the benefit of the doubt.This scenario is not lost on the Fed, which is why in March, 2009, its Board of Governors concocted a fraudulent accounting scheme (implemented retroactively to include the year 2008), which allows it to operate with negative income. It also prevents its member banks from having to pony up the difference, which was the case prior to the accounting change. Instead, in this scenario, the interest that the Treasury pays on securities held by the Fed will go to the banks, instead of back to the Treasury.It's beyond the scope of this response to discuss all the details. However, in brief, the Fed allows a line item on the liability side of its balance sheet (specifically, the one that covers remittances to the US Treasury) to go negative. It creates a deferred asset from a hypothetical amount it will be remitting to the Treasury at some non-specified time in the future.The heads of anyone with accounting knowledge ought to be spinning right now. For everyone else, it's as though you or I could log into our bank account and increase our balance in any given month in which expenses exceed income, with the promise that we will correspondingly lower our balance the next time we have a surplus.Only, there is no guarantee that you or I would ever again generate a surplus--meaning, we would have printed ourselves money not to be repaid. Similarly, there is not any reason to believe that once the Fed goes cash flow negative that it will ever again generate a surplus.This creates the absurd scenario that the Fed could end up printing money as a tightening measure to reign in price inflation. Welcome to the grave that Mr. Bernanke [and Mr. Sack continue] to dig deeper for us. [They assure] us there will be nothing but an orderly withdrawal from this unprecedented activity. However, markets have a way of punishing central banker hubris.
Mr. Sack will step down as head of the Markets Group and SOMA Manager on June 29, 2012. He will then be placed on leave until September 14, 2012, during which he will have limited contact with the Bank and no access to Bank information, including FOMC and supervisory materials.
If that is a year-anniversary, it may satisfy his third complete year, possibly completing the checkbox for comps to give him the summer off paid. I've never met a public employee who did not know, to two decimals, the exact countdown to some comp deadline. The FED's benefits list runs to three pages. He's a relatively young man. No one ever went broke over-estimating the self interest of publicly paid servants.
A spokesman for the New York Fed said, "[Mr. Sack] will continue in his current role 'until June 29, 2012, to help ensure a smooth transition'. He is being placed on leave to establish a reasonable time period between his cessation of work and any potential future outside commitment."
It appears our friend, Mr. Brian Sack, likely has something else big lined up--perhaps, a job of import that might be influenced by future FOMC meetings, including the two during his leave period? Will it be the World Bank, the IMF, or something more lucrative with BlackRock or Citi? We'll have to wait to see, but in the meantime, here's to the [relatively] unsung soldier who helped design and deliver quantitative easing and all its yet-to-be-experienced [side] effects to the US [and, by extension, World].
Special thanks to Ellis Wyatt for carrying the torch.
Sunday, April 22, 2012
MF Global Roundup: the [so-far] Great Escape of "Teflon Don" Corzine; Bankruptcy Shenanigans Exposed; the "F" Word Revisited
- Why was the MF Global back office cleared out with three top personnel allowed to leave, just as the firm was exeriencing its most serious liquidity (ahem solvency) crisis in its soon-to-be-terminated existence?
- Why were C-level executives, far from being sequestered by investigators and being placed in an information silo, allowed to run the company for six weeks (prior to Mr. Freeh being installed as Trustee of the Holdings company)?
- Why did Freeh wait until early March to have MF Global Holdings USA declare bankruptcy, the very entity that retained the few remaining executives and employees and may have been cash-rich?
- Why did Federal cops and investigators fail to so much as question Mr. Corzine nearly six months after the crime?
- Why were large counterparties paid with wire transfers, when requests from lowly customers for wires were converted to checks (which ultimately bounced)? "Sloppy is when you don't do things consistently. Sending all checks to customers and all wires to counterparties--that's consistent." See here for details published by John Roe of the Commodity Customer Coalition.
- Why were the final days characterized as so "chaotic" when a properly programmed iPhone or Android smart phone (sorry, RIMM) should have been able to handle what amounts to maybe a few dozen megabytes of transfer instructions?
- Just what were the details surrounding the successful lobbying effort by top level MF Global execs that effectively postponed reforms on rules that would limit use of customer funds (coincidentally, or not perhaps, just ahead of a $325 million bond offering by MF Global)? [For more details, see our prior piece from this week, which includes exclusive CFTC emails on the issue.]
Compared to Corzine’s former employer, Goldman Sachs, MF Global was a flea on an elephant’s back. It had experienced a string of quarterly losses since 2007, was predominantly a Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) holding retail and institutional commodity and futures trading accounts, and had 80 regulatory actions against it since 1997. It had a securities brokerage unit with 300 to 400 U.S. accounts according to the trustee. How big those accounts were is unknown. If they were all institutional or hedge fund accounts, it could have been a sizeable operation. One known account, which presciently moved out before the bankruptcy, belonged to the $100 billion private energy firm, Koch Industries, majority owned by Charles and David Koch, financial backers to numerous corporate front groups.
It's time for Congress to put pressure on those in charge of this investigation and oversight to break their own glass of silence and dare them to utter the magic "F" word.
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
MF Global Circus: A New Senate Hearing & CFTC Divulges Exclusive Emails Re Corzine/Gensler Meetings
A new Senate hearing during "Money Smart Week"
The MF Global circus continues, as only yesterday, the Senate Banking Committee announced it will hold a hearing next Tuesday, April 24, 2012, in which a few old and a few new faces will grace Congressional Chambers. We can only hope that some of the Committee members will pursue the panelists with the same zeal that certain members of the House Financial Services Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee did in their three hearings.
According to a press release that arrived in our email box this morning, next week is Money Smart Week at the Chicago Fed. The awkward phrasing sure sounds smart. The National Futures Association, the CFTC and AARP will hold a seminar entitled "Avoiding Fraud is Your Best Money Strategy." No kidding. Tell that to Mr. Corzine and the MF Global customers. The always pithy CFTC Chairman Gensler had a few choice words as well: "When making important financial decisions, even simple actions like asking a few smart questions can help set people on the right course." Right...and where were your smart questions, Mr. Gensler, when you let the SEC steamroll the CFTC into accepting a bankruptcy and liquidation structure of MF Global and its broker unit such that the customers ended up on equal footing with creditors?
Maybe the SEC's Director of the Division of Trading and Markets, Mr. Robert Cook, can shed some light at next week's Senate Banking Committee hearing on why he ordered a firm with 388 securities accounts and 38,000 futures accounts to be put into a SIPC liquidation, where there is no insurance fund for futures customers and where the liquidation Trustee has no clear right to assets in the parent company's Chapter 11 estate.
And, if Mr. Gensler truly believes that the "CFTC exists to protect Americans in financial markets and to ensure the integrity of the marketplace for investors," perhaps CFTC Commissioner Jill Sommers can enlighten the Senate and public as to why the CFTC delayed implementing reforms to Rule 1.25 governing investment of customer funds, conveniently around the time when Mr. Corzine and his fellow ex-Goldmanite general counsel, Laurie Ferber, were meeting with Chairman Gensler, CFTC Commissioners and other high level CFTC officials in July. Only after MF Global's demise did it become imperative to finally implement the changes, now dubbed appropriately, the "MF Global Rule."
CFTC discloses new emails regarding top level meetings with Gensler, Corzine and Ferber
This gets to another event that transpired yesterday, wherein the CFTC finally responded to a five month old FOIA request regarding those very meetings on July 20, 2011. EconomicPolicyJournal.com has exclusively obtained a smattering of emails from such figures as Ms. Ferber, Chairman Gensler and Amanda Radhakrishnan, Director of Clearing and Risk for the CFTC.
In one email from Ms. Ferber to Ms. Radhakrishnan on the morning of the 20th, she pleads "I know you must be truly swamped, but I also know that we are having calls with some commissioners today...I continue to believe that you and your team are the most important to be speaking with on 1.25 and I know Jon [Corzine] would appreciate the opportunity to speak with you."
In another series of emails, we learn that Chairman Gensler initially turned down a request on July 11, 2011 from Mr. Ferber to meet with Corzine, [ex-Refco exec] Dennis Klejna and others on either the 20th or 21st, citing scheduling conflicts. (See Francine McKenna's article for background on Klejna and JP Morgan's inside track to MF Global here). Yet, Mr. Gensler would eventually make a point to chat by telephone with Corzine and others on a 1:00 pm call on July 20. Such was the former Senator and Governor's clout, or the zeal and persistence of Ms. Ferber.
Certain details of these meetings were already public, having been posted on the CFTC's website. (We first wrote about them in detail on November 9, 2011.) But we now know exactly who pushed for them (Ferber) and just how badly Corzine needed to wield his starpower in front of the regulators. After all, MF Global was about to float a $325 million bond offering (now practically worthless) that would close just days later on August 2, 2011, and any threat to MF's revenue model would have likely derailed it.
Regulatory Capture Kept the Corzine Trade Alive
According to a Bloomberg piece by William Cohen, Corzine himself said that the repo transactions pursuant to 1.25 made with customer funds with other broker-dealers as counterparties should be permitted “because such transactions could be beneficial to” firms like MF Global. Without the extra income from investing customer funds (and they need not have been necessarily invested directly in the sovereign bonds), the Corzine Trade would be toast.
This was also a time when FINRA was about to push for a regulatory capital hike (eventually stalled by Corzine at the SEC, but not ultimately defeated), and a time when the SEC decided to sit on the annual audit of the broker unit for over three months instead of making it public right away as it customarily does. This was the only document that would have been public at the time that disclosed the true risk of the Corzine trade to MF Global customers, wherein all of the risk was saddled in the broker unit and the bulk of the profits were sent overseas.
But we digress. Back to those July 20 CFTC/MF Global meetings, what was the outcome? According to the Federal Register, the CFTC filed on July 22, 2011 a notice effective July 20, 2011 regarding other rulemaking, and provided a footnote disclosing that "The amendments [to Rule 1.25 and 30.7] proposed in those Notices are not addressed herein and may be subject to future Commission rulemaking." Apparently, Corzine and Ferber won...at least for the time being.
MF Global's long standing push against Rule 1.25 reform
But July, 2011 was not the first time that MF Global had pushed against Rule 1.25 reform. Only months after it put on the Corzine Trade in September, 2010 (and lying about its existence to FINRA that same month), Ms. Ferber and a representative from Newedge penned a letter on December 2, 2010 to the CFTC. As we quoted on November 9, 2011:
As a general matter, we applaud the CFTC for seeking new ways to ensure the safety and liquidity of investments made by futures commission merchants under CFTC Rules 1.25 and 30.7. However, as we set forth below, we believe the specific amendments being proposed: (a) are unnecessary, considering that the current permissible investments under Rule 1.25 have not, to our knowledge, resulted in any FCM's inability to provide customers their segregated funds upon request or to continue as a solvent entity, (b) will, in many cases, create new investment risks and logistical difficulties for FCMs, and (c) may well change the pricing dynamics for customers and the industry at large. Recognizing the CFTC's concerns, however, we have set forth our own proposed amendments which we believe satisfy the CFTC's desire for the enhanced security of customer segregated funds without the risk of significantly increasing costs to customers.
B. The Investments Currently Permitted Under Rule 1.25 Have Not Put CustomerFunds at Risk.We believe strongly that the CFTC's proposed amendments endeavor to "fix something that is not broken." Indeed, the evidence is clear that the investments permitted and safeguards required under Rule 1.25 have met the CFTC's stated "objectives of preserving principal and maintaining liquidity" of customer segregated funds. Sec Rule 1.25(b). Among other things, since the CFTC's 2004 expansion of permissible investments under RuIe 1.25, we are not aware of any FCM that has been unable to liquidate and provide to their customers upon request any segregated funds invested under Rule 1.25 (or under Regulation 30.7 either, for that matter).4Further, since this expansion, no FCM to our knowledge has failed or otherwise been unable to meet any other of its financial obligations as a result of investments made under Rule 1.25.5 In short, we believe the current investment criteria set forth under Rule 1.25 have worked, including over the past two years of market instability and uncertainty - the ultimate stress test. Nevertheless, the Commission has proposed changes so sweeping that they may in fact increase systemic risk by imposing new burdens on otherwise effective, efficient and liquid settlement processes. Such a radical overhaul, in our view, is unnecessary considering the Rule's stellar track record. At most, the CFTC should be adjusting only slightly the products, counterparties and concentration percentages currently permitted. 6
Need for a fraud investigation and lawsuits against the execs
Mr. Corzine and Ms. Ferber, apparently operating under an end-justifies-the-means ethics, did not get their desired end, and now face a greatly undesired one. They need to be held personally accountable, both criminally and civily, for their actions, should the facts warrant (which we believe they do). The case, far from being cold, is just getting warmed up. We hope the SIPC Trustee, James W. Giddens, keeps his word when he said last week he would go after MF Global personnel who broke the law by dipping into segregated funds. We have also hopefully established enough intent to justify a fraud investigation by the DOJ, not that intent is a prerequisite to clawing back missing customer funds, which are statutorily required to be sacrosanct at all times.
Using his former Congressional chambers as a stage, Mr. Corzine has theatrically attempted to set up a MF Global back office worker, one Edith O'Brien, to take the fall for it all. While she may or may not have some culpability as firm Treasurer, she appears to hold the key to unraveling the mystery that has always been exposed in plain day. If anyone deserves immunity, it is she.
A video explains it all
Explaining the situation in simple terms with some great background is Mark Melin of Opalesque TV. Feel free to forward to anyone who might not be up to speed on MF Global, as this first part in a series of three is an excellent primer. Mark will also appear on RT's Capital Account with Lauren Lyster [Friday] to discuss these latest developments.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DivZs29GxL4
Friday, April 6, 2012
Is Bernanke Prepping the Banksters for QE3?
- [JP Morgan Chase President Jamie] Dimon,
- New York Fed President William Dudley
- Michael Cavanagh, chief executive officer of Treasury and Securities Services for J.P. Morgan Chase
- Bob Diamond, chief executive of Barclays PLC
- Douglas Donahue, Jr., managing partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.
- Brady Dougan, chief executive of Credit Suisse
- Larry Fink, chief executive of BlackRock, Inc.
- Gerald Hassell, chief executive of Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
- Glenn Hutchins, managing director of Silver Lake
- Colm Kelleher, co-president of institutional securities, of Morgan Stanley
- Brian Leach, chief risk officer of Citigroup, Inc.
- Brian Moynihan, chief executive of Bank of America Corp.
- Stephen Schwarzman, chief executive of the Blackstone Group LP
- James Tisch, president and chief executive of Loews Corp. and
- David Viniar, chief financial officer of Goldman Sachs Group Inc.