Remember the Audit the Fed bill that was supposed to bring the financial system to its knees if Congress dared pass it? Remember the toothless, watered down version that finally made it into Dodd-Frank and at the time was itself controversial?
Pursuant to direction under Dodd-Frank, the Government Accountability Office today released a 266 page report detailing its findings after a review of the numerous emergency programs instituted by the Federal Reserve from 2008 to 2010. Among the many findings was that the bulk of over half billion dollars in service contracts were awarded without bid. While the report is a step in the right direction, its failure to mention the most suspicious contract (about which we know only because of Congressionally subpoenaed email records of the New York Fed), suggests the review was either facile or compromised. In other words, we cannot rely on even the simplest of half measures when it comes to providing Fed accountability.
Here is what the GAO wrote (all bolding and brackets are ours, throughout this post):
Reserve Banks Awarded Largest Contracts Noncompetitvely and Would Benefit From Additional Guidance on Seeking CompetitionAlthough FRBNY awarded contracts both competitively andnoncompetitively for the emergency programs, the highest-valuecontracts were awarded noncompetitively due to exigent circumstances.FRBNY awarded almost two-thirds of its contracts noncompetitively,which accounted for 79 percent of all vendor compensation (see fig. 4).Eight of the 10 largest contracts were awarded noncompetitively. Thelargest noncompetitive contract was valued at more than $108.4 million,while the largest competitive contract was valued at $26.6 million.Click image to enlarge.
Explaining the process by which FRBNY awarded contracts:
FRBNY awarded contracts in accordance with its acquisition policy, whichapplied to all services associated with the emergency programs andsingle-institution assistance. FRBNY is a private corporation created bystatute and is not subject to the FAR. Instead, FRBNY developed its ownacquisition policy, called Operating Bulletin 10.Operating Bulletin 10 states that business areas may use noncompetitiveprocesses in special circumstances, such as when a service is availablefrom only one vendor or in exigent circumstances. FRBNY cited exigentcircumstances for the majority of the noncompetitive contract awards.78
Footnote 78 reads:
78 Of the noncompetitive contracts we reviewed, FRBNY awarded only three under the sole-source exception, when a service was available from only one vendor.
This fact will be key later on. Delving into the GAO's findings:
A guiding principle of the FAR, which applies to all executive agencies,not to the Reserve Banks, is to ensure that agencies are able to deliverthe best value product or service in a timely manner while fulfillingagencies’ policy objectives. Similarly, Operating Bulletin 10 provides aframework for acquiring goods and services at the most favorable terms.However, while the FAR requires certain activities for noncompetitiveawards and identifies specific steps to take, Operating Bulletin 10 doesnot. Without similar guidance, FRBNY could be missing opportunities to enhance competition and provide the best value service innoncompetitive awards. Examples of activities required or restricted bythe FAR include the following:Soliciting multiple bids. The FAR requires contracting officers to solicitas many offers as is practicable in the absence of full and opencompetition.79 FRBNY officials stated that in noncompetitivecircumstances business areas are encouraged to collect a reasonablenumber of competitive quotations and noted that, in at least somecases, staff members contacted multiple vendors before awardingcontracts noncompetitively. However, FRBNY did not contact multiplevendors before awarding some of the largest noncompetitiveemergency program and assistance contracts.80Restrictions on contract duration and scope. Operating Bulletin 10does not place any limits or restrictions on the duration of anoncompetitive contract, nor does it require subsequent competition.In contrast, the FAR generally limits the duration of contracts awardedunder “exigent circumstances” to the time necessary to meet theunusual and compelling requirements and award a new contract usingcompetitive procedures, and such contracts may generally not exceed1 year.81 FRBNY’s longest and most expensive contracts wereawarded noncompetitively and lasted more than 2 years and, in somecases, could potentially last as long as 10 years.82 Some of thesecontracts included distinct services that, while related, were needed atdifferent times and with different degrees of urgency. FRBNY officialssaid that in some cases they think there would be limited benefits toopening noncompetitive contracts to competition. FRBNY heldsubsequent competitions for competitively awarded Agency MBSprogram and TALF contracts when the terms of the programschanged.Justifying noncompetitive procedures. Operating Bulletin 10 requiresbusiness areas to draft a memorandum that includes sufficientdocumentation to justify the noncompetitive acquisition. However,Operating Bulletin 10 does not provide guidance on what informationshould be included in the memorandum. FRBNY justificationmemoranda typically included background information on theemergency program, vendor scope of work, vendor selection factors,and an explanation of the special circumstances necessitatingnoncompetitive awards. The memoranda did not typically identifyefforts made to promote competition, which the FAR requires.
Regarding Vendor Selection Criteria, the GAO makes a curious statement in the next paragraph:
FRBNY considered a number of factors when selecting vendors for bothcompetitive and noncompetitive contract awards, including a vendor’sknowledge and expertise and ability to meet program requirements.FRBNY also considered a vendor’s previous working relationship withFRBNY or program participants as part of the selection criteria forcompetitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts. FRBNY selectedvendors that had previous working relationships with FRBNY and theprogram recipients so that it could leverage that familiarity to shorten thevendor’s learning curve or ramp-up time. For example, FRBNYnoncompetitively selected BlackRock as the investment manager forMaiden Lanes II and III because BlackRock had already evaluated theunderlying assets pursuant to an engagement with AIG prior to theextension of credit by FRBNY.
These would constitute two of the three sole-source contracts mentioned in footnote 78, above. The appendixes disclose that BlackRock earned $24.1 million and $50.0 million for serving as the investment manager of Maiden Lane II and III, respectively.
BlackRock was also the investment manager for the original Maiden Lane portfolio that took on the toxic Bear Stearns assets. For serving as investment manager, it was paid $107.6 million in fees.
Recall that there are two bases upon which a no-bid contracts would be awarded: exigency or sole source, whereby there are no practical alternatives to a single service provider. The GAO report does not say on what basis the BlackRock Maiden Lane no-bid contract was awarded, but given the roughly three month window between the mid-March announcement of the new facility and the commencement of management by BlackRock in late June, it would be difficult to claim exigency. Also note the contract was not dated until September 9, 2008, several months later.
Thanks to the aforementioned subpoenaed emails of the NY Fed, we do in fact know that the BlackRock Maiden was sole-sourced. As we wrote in January, 2011:
[W]e'd like to know why BlackRock management of Maiden Lane I was sole sourced without a "clear reason", as is implied by the below email to FRBNY [then] Senior VP, Sarah Dahlgren, which we excerpt from the below document presented to Congress, with emphasis and brackets ours:To Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRSRe: Sole SourceSpent some time with him [Tom Baxter, Jr., FRBNY GC] tonight. (He doesn't understand ML3, and I can't begin explain it either -- so don't needle him! -- and I am going to have [Paul] Whynott [FRBNY VP] spend some time with him tomorrow, BTW, you might touch base with Joyce [Hansen, FRBNY Deputy GC] about her reaction to Sunday's briefing; I think she had some concerns about how ML3 was presented to Geithner, which she expressed to Paul.) [Geithner] knew that Stephanie [Heller?, FRBNY Asst. GC] was handling the Blackrock contract -- he didn't express any concerns -- and I explained that, in contrast to MLI, we had a clear reason to sole source it this time (that they had already modeled, etc.). So, although I have no worries, yes, probably worth reviewing it with him [Geithner] before taking it to Tom."
It appears there was quite some consternation at the highest levels at the NY Fed about this contract award, yet no mention in the GAO report.
In follow up posts, we will document the full email chain from which the above was excerpted, explore just exactly how the NY Fed's Acquisition Policy (Operating Bulletin Number 10) implicates some of the country's top bankers in this no-bid contract scandal, discuss the GAO's findings of failure in conflicts of interest disclosure, and the GAO's own failure to follow its Congressional mandate under Dodd-Frank.